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MUNICIPAL LIABILITY UNDER
SUPERFUND AS GENERATORS OF
MUNICIPAL SOLID WASTE:
ADDRESSING THE PLIGHT OF
LOCAL GOVERNMENTS
INTRODUCTION
The ever-burgeoning problem of how to deal with hazardous waste
sites, along with the concomitant issue of upon whom to impose the
cleanup costs, continues to be of national importance in the 1990s.1 At
the federal level, the chief remedial scheme is the Comprehensive Envi-
ronmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA).2
CERCLA establishes a trust fund, the "Superfund" 3 to finance the
1. In the early 1980s, hazardous waste sites drew national attention when the horror
stories of Love Canal, Times Beach, and Valley of the Drums surfaced. See, eg.,
Wayne Biddle, Toxic Chemicals Imperil Flooded Town in Missouri, N.Y. TIMEs, Dec.
16, 1982, at A17 (describing the discovery of chemical dioxin and other hazardous
chemicals at Times Beach, Missouri); Maryann Bird, Issue and Debate Battle of Toxic
Dumps: Who Pays for Cleanup?, N.Y. TIMES, July 11, 1980, at B4 (discussing the prob-
lem of toxic waste cleanup); Robert A. Kittle, Living With Uncertainty: Saga of Love
Canal Families, U.S. NEws & WORLD REP., June 2, 1980, at 32 (describing the inci-
dent at Love Canal).
2. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1988). Though enacted in 1980, Congress reauthorized
CERCLA in October 1986 for an additional five years by the Superfund Amendments
and Reauthorization Act (SARA). See 42 U.S.C. § 9611(a) (1988). As an amendment
to the 1990 budget, Congress extended the 1991 expiration date for another four years.
White House Launches Superfund Review, Worrying Environmentalists, INSIDE E.P.A.,
July 12, 1991, at 1, 7.
CERCLA and its amendments are also known as "Superfund." These terms are used
interchangeably throughout this Note.
3. 42 U.S.C. § 9611 (1988). A tax on the petroleum and chemical industries was the
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cleanup of abandoned or inactive hazardous waste sites.' CERCLA
allows the government to identify "potentially responsible parties"
(PRPs) and sue them to recover the cleanup costs.' PRPs include gen-
erators or transporters of hazardous substances as well as owners or
operators of landfills where such substances have been, or could be
released.6
The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has typically ex-
primary funding for the original $1.6 billion Superfund. General appropriations com-
prised only one-eighth of the total fund. Steven Ferrey, The Toxic Time Bomb: Munici-
pal Liability for the Cleanup of Hazardous Waste, 57 Gao. WASH. L. REV. 197, 223
(1988). SARA increased the amount to $8.5 billion over a five year period, in addition
to expanding Superfund's tax base. Id. at 223-24. See also 42 U.S.C. § 9611(a) (1988).
4. Hazardous waste sites become Superfund sites, and therefore eligible for funding,
when listed on the National Priorities List (NPL). 42 U.S.C. § 961 1(a)(2) (1988). CER-
CLA mandates to the President the power to prioritize the nation's worst toxic waste
sites by considering the relative risk of danger to the public health or welfare or the
environment, the population at risk, the dangerous potential of the hazardous sub-
stances, and the potential for contamination of the drinking water. 42 U.S.C.
§ 9605(a)(8)(B) (1988). A waste site is listed on the NPL if it receives a score of 28.5
under EPA's Hazard Ranking System (HRS). Rena Steinzor, Local Governments and
Superfund: Who Will Pay the Tab?, 22 URB. LAW. 79, 79 n.1 (1990) (explaining the
NPL and the criteria for site selection). The comprehensive method of calculating the
HRS score evaluates four pathways: ground water migration, surface water migration,
soil exposure, and air migration. 40 C.F.R. pt. 300, app. A (1991). Currently, the NPL
contains 1188 sites. 40 C.F.R. pt. 300, app. B (1991).
5. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (1988). Section 104 of CERCLA authorizes the President to
take emergency measures to counteract a release or threatened release of a hazardous
substance into the environment. 42 U.S.C. § 9604 (1988). If EPA does not use its au-
thority under § 104 to clean up a site, it may issue an administrative order, under § 106,
to require the PRPs to organize cleanup action of the site. 42 U.S.C. § 9606(c) (1988).
Pursuant to § 107, if EPA exercises its cleanup authority at a site, it may then sue any
PRPs to recover the costs. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (1988).
6. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (1988). This section provides:
Notwithstanding any other provision or rule of law, and subject only to the de-
fenses set forth in subsection (b) of this section-
(1) the owner and operator of a vessel or a facility,
(2) any person who at the time of disposal of any hazardous substance owned or
operated any facility at which such hazardous substances were disposed of,
(3) any person who by contract, agreement, or otherwise arranged for disposal
or treatment, or arranged with a transporter for transport for disposal or treat-
ment, of hazardous substances owned or possessed by such person, by any other
party or entity .... and containing such hazardous substances, and
(4) any person who accepts or accepted any hazardous substances for transport
to disposal or treatment facilities, incineration vessels or sites selected by such per-
son, from which there is a release, or a threatened release which causes the incur-
rence of response costs, of a hazardous substance, shall be liable for-
(A) all costs of removal or remedial action incurred by the United States Gov-
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ercised its discretion to impose liability for the cleanup costs by focus-
ing on the private sector.7 As the nation enters its second decade of
litigation under Superfund, however, governmental units are finding
themselves more vulnerable.' In an effort to find another party to
shoulder the costs of Superfund liability, industrial PRPs are suing lo-
cal governments for contribution.9 Municipalities have traditionally
collected and transported household trash or municipal solid waste
(MSW), 1° or have made arrangements for the collection and disposal
of such waste through private contracts.' In providing these services,
industrial PRPs assert that municipalities are liable under CERCLA as
emiment or a State or an Indian tribe not inconsistent with the national contin-
gency plan;
(B) any other necessary costs of response incurred by any other person consis-
tent with the national contingency plan;
(C) damages for injury to, destruction of, or loss of natural resources, including
the reasonable costs of assessing such injury, destruction, or loss resulting from
such a release; and
(D) the costs of any health assessment or health effects study carried out under
section 9604(i) of this title.
Id.
7. See Steinzor, supra note 4, at 81 (noting the heavy burden placed on the manu-
facturing industry). Cf. Ferrey, supra note 3, at 199 (discussing the inequity of EPA's
exercise of discretion in exempting public entities from liability).
8. See Steinzor, supra note 4, at 80-84 (explaining the trend toward imposing liabil-
ity on local governments).
9. Id. at 81 ("Until recently, the brunt of Superfund's heavy liability burden has
been born [sic] by the manufacturing sector... [which has] begun to search for fellow
'deep pockets' to help shoulder multi-billion dollar cleanup costs."). See infra note 24
for a list of suits pending against municipalities.
10. EPA defines municipal solid waste as "solid waste generated primarily by
households, but [possibly including] some contribution of wastes from commercial, in-
stitutional and industrial sources as well." Superfund Program; Interim Municipal Set-
tlement Policy, 54 Fed. Reg. 51,071, 51,074 (1989) [hereinafter EPA Interim Policy].
As EPA explains, MSW generally consists of large volumes of non-hazardous sub-
stances (e.g., yard waste, food, glass, and aluminum) and may contain small amounts of
household hazardous waste (e.g., pesticides and solvents), as well as small quantities of
generator waste (i.e. waste contributed by generators who produce less than 100 kilo-
grams per month of hazardous waste and less than 1 kilogram per month of acutely
hazardous waste, as defined under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act
(RCRA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992k (1988)). Id.
Reference to MSW in this Note is done with EPA's definition in mind.
11. See Hon. James J. Florio et al., Too-Strict Liability: Making Local Government
Entities Pay for Waste Disposal Site Cleanup, I VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 105, 118 (1990)
("The collection and disposal of municipal solid waste has long been a traditional local
government function.").
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waste generators and transporters. 12
The third party lawsuits brought by industrial PRPs against munici-
palities attempt to equate MSW with industrial waste.13 MSW, how-
ever, contains very low percentages of hazardous waste.14 Although
approximately twenty percent of the sites listed on the Superfund Na-
tional Priorities List (NPL)15 are municipal landfills,16 virtually all
12. Although beyond the scope of this Note, municipalities may also be held liable
as past or present owners or operators of landfills containing hazardous substances. See,
eg., N.J. Dep't. of Envtl. Prot. v. Gloucester Envtl. Mgt. Servs., 719 F. Supp. 325
(D.N.J. 1989) (state suing township, and other parties, as owner of landfill); United
States v. Serafini, 706 F. Supp. 354 (M.D. Pa. 1989) (government suing to recover
cleanup costs of dump site operated by city); New York v. City of Johnstown, 701 F.
Supp. 33 (N.D.N.Y. 1988) (state suing two cities to recover response costs of each one's
landfill); United States v. New Castle County, 642 F. Supp. 1258 (D. Del. 1986) (gov-
ernment suing county and other parties to recover response costs); United States v.
Seymour Recycling Corp., 554 F. Supp. 1334 (S.D. Ind. 1982) (government suing city
that was part owner of waste site).
These cases illustrate the complexity of litigation involving municipal owners and
operators. For a thorough discussion of municipal liability as owners and operators, see
Steinzor, supra note 4, at 105-13.
13. As one researcher noted, "[tihe home garbage pail is a leaking sieve of toxic and
potentially toxic chemical agents." Ferrey, supra note 3, at 202. See also id. at 201-10
(listing the hazardous constituents of the municipal waste stream and suggesting that
these constituents are capable of contaminating groundwater and causing other hazards
much like industrial waste). The list of hazardous household waste products includes
household cleaners, paint products, chemical drain openers, batteries, pesticides and
herbicides, alcohols, oils and greases, polishes and waxes, along with cosmetics and
dyes. Id. at 205.
14. See B.F. Goodrich Co. v. Murtha, 754 F. Supp. 960, 964 n.8 (D. Conn. 1991)
(noting that most studies indicate that MSW contains not more than 1% hazardous
waste by weight), aff'd 958 F.2d 1192 (2d Cir. 1992). See also Ferrey, supra note 3, at
210 & nn.55-56 (noting survey results that indicate hazardous wastes constitute a maxi-
mum of 0.1% to 0.5% by weight of MSW).
15. See 40 C.F.R. pt. 300, app. B (1991). See also supra note 4 for discussion of
how sites become listed on the NPL.
16. EPA Interim Policy, supra note 10, at 51,071. See also Steinzor, supra note 4,
at 79 ("Roughly 20% of the 1,226 sites on the Superfund National Priorities List (NPL)
are municipal landfills.").
EPA characterizes "municipal landfills" as those sites "that have accepted [MSW] for
disposal, regardless of the amount, or that are owned or operated by a municipality,
regardless of whether the landfill is primarily composed of municipal or non-municipal
waste." EPA Interim Settlement Guidance for Generators and Transporters of Munici-
pal Solid Waste, U.S. EPA, OSWER Directive 9834.13-la, 6 (March 1992) [hereinafter
EPA Interim Settlement Guidance] (citing Superfund Program; Interim Municipal Set-
tlement Policy, 54 Fed. Reg. 51,071-76 (1989)). Municipal landfills may be owned or
operated by municipalities, or they may be privately owned or operated and have re-
ceived MSW for disposal. EPA Interim Policy, supra note 10, at 51,074.
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have been contaminated by the co-disposal of industrial waste with
MSW. 7 Indeed, very few are facilities where strictly municipal gar-
bage was disposed.18 With the cost of cleaning up hazardous waste
sites estimated at $750 billion,19 consumers will be forced to pay at
least $2,00020 in the form of price increases on industrial products. If
the scope of parties held liable for the cleanup of toxic waste sites is
broadened to include municipalities, local taxpayers will be forced to
bear the costs in the form of raised taxes as well. 2
Contrary to the intent of Superfund,22 the third party lawsuits have
17. See EPA Interim Settlement Guidance, supra note 16, at 6 ("The [EPA] believes
that co-disposal of MSW with industrial wastes has occurred at virtually all of the mu-
nicipal landfills on the NPL.").
18. Rena I. Steinzor & Matthew F. Lintner, Should Taxpayers Pay the Cost of
Superfund?, 22 ENVrL. L. REP. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,089, 10,089 (Feb. 1992) (citing
Letter from Don R. Clay, EPA Assistant Administrator for Solid Waste and Emer-
gency Response, to the Honorable Esteban Torres (Aug. 29, 1991)).
19. Study Finds Potential Hazardous Waste Cleanup Costs May Top $1.5-Trillion,
INSIDE E.P.A., Jan. 3, 1992, at 13 (citing a study done by the University of Tennessee).
Two recent studies estimated the cleanup costs to total $1 trillion. See Frank Viviano,
Superfund Wallowing in Financial Mire, MILw. J., June 16, 1991, at J1, J3 (citing an
estimate given by Salomon Brothers, a brokerage firm, and Hirschhorn and Associates,
an environmental consulting firm).
20. Viviano, supra note 19, at J3. See also Barnett M. Lawrence, Comment, Liabil-
ity of Corporate Officers Under CERCLA: An Ounce of Prevention May Be the Cure, 20
ENVTL. L. REP. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,377, 10,377 (Sept. 1990) ("Estimates of hazardous
waste cleanup costs now reach... $2,000 for every man, woman, and child in the
United States.").
21. Robert Tomsho, Pollution Ploy: Big Corporations Hit by Superfund Cases Find
Way to Share Bill, WALL ST. J., Apr. 2, 1991, at Al (discussing the trend of corpora-
tions to bring contribution suits against "municipalities and other governmental entities
that can raise money via taxes").
22. As Senator Lautenberg, Chairman of the Senate Superfund Subcommittee, de-
clared: "I say without reservation that the original statute never intended [municipal
and small business generators or transporters] be sued... [W]e are being true to the
intent of the law when we prevent industrial polluters from trying to shift their cleanup
costs to innocent cities, towns, and small businesses." 138 CONG. REc. S8629 (daily ed.
June 23, 1992) (statement of Sen. Lautenberg).
Congress chose to place the burden on industry rather than the taxpayer because it
felt that "society should not bear the cost of protecting the public from hazards pro-
duced in the past by a generator, transporter, consumer, or dumpsite owner-operator
who has profited or otherwise benefitted from commerce involving these substances and
now wishes to be insulated from any continuing responsibilities for the present hazards
to society that have been created.... [R]elieving industry of responsibility establishes a
precedent seriously adverse to the public interest...." Ohio ex rel Brown v. Georgeoff,
562 F. Supp. 1300, 1312 (N.D. Ohio 1983) (citing S. REP. No. 848, 96th Cong., 2d Sess.
98 (1980)).
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continued to proceed against hundreds of municipalities. 23 With the
degree of liability and the allocation of costs still undetermined, the
issue of municipal liability under Superfund now confronts the EPA,
the courts, and the legislature.' 4
This Note analyzes the issue of municipalities' liability under CER-
CLA as generators of MSW.25 Part I examines the statutory provi-
sions of RCRA and CERCLA, with a focus on municipal liability for
the disposal of MSW under those schemes. Part II analyzes EPA's
policies on municipal liability. Part III surveys the case law addressing
municipal liability under Superfund. Part IV discusses recent congres-
sional proposals to amend CERCLA to limit municipal liability under
contribution actions. Part V attempts to put the issue of municipal
23. See 138 CONG. REc. S8630 (daily ed. June 23, 1992) (statement of Sen.
Lautenberg) (indicating that at least 450 municipalities in 11 states are currently in-
volved in lawsuits).
24. The trend to get municipalities involved in the liability scheme is exemplified in
actions involving 9 landfills. The list of suits pending includes:
(1) Operating Industries Landfill, Monterey Park, California (64 corporations named
as PRPs fied third party suit against 29 cities),
(2) Los Angeles-Long Beach Harbor, California (2 companies suing 115 local gov-
ernments based on ownership of the pipelines into which the companies poured hazard-
ous substances),
(3) Beacon Heights Landfill and Laurel Park Landfill, Naugatuck Borough, Con-
necticut (private party PRPs suing 24 local governments for contribution),
(4) Helen Kramer Landfill, Mantua Township, New Jersey (companies suing 18 lo-
cal governments for their disposal of MSW),
(5) Charles-George Reclamation Landfill, Tynsborough, Massachusetts (corporate
parties suing 12 municipalities for contribution),
(6) Gloucester Environmental Management Services Landfill (GEMS), Gloucester
Township, New Jersey (company PRPs bringing third party suit against 50 local gov-
ernments),
(7) Moyers Landfill, Eagleville, Pennsylvania (companies suing 7 local governments
for cleanup costs),
(8) Ludlow Sand and Gravel Landfill, Clayville, New York (39 cities sued for dispos-
ing of trash), and
(9) Mid-State Disposal Site, Cleveland Township, Wisconsin (11 municipalities at-
tempting to settle with PRPs). Keith Schneider, Industries Battle Cities on Funds For
Toxic Waste, N.Y. TiMm., July 18, 1991, at Al, A9 (listing the waste sites and parties
currently involved in litigation). See also Tomsho, supra note 21, at A14 (tracing the
events and parties at the New York Ludlow Landfill).
25. Liability of municipalities as transporters of MSW is closely intertwined with
the subject matter of this Note. Because the activities that trigger generator liability
could similarly trigger transporter liability, suits against municipalities could be based
on either or both of the theories. Liability of municipalities as transporters is therefore
mentioned intermittently throughout this Note. For a general discussion of liability of
municipalities as transporters under Superfund, see Steinzor, supra note 4, at 128-30.
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liability into perspective by addressing the conflicting positions of in-
dustries and local governments, while also considering the policies un-
derlying Superfund. Part VI discusses the possible approaches for
apportioning costs of Superfund liability. This Note concludes that ef-
fectuating the intent and policy goals of Superfund requires action at
the national level. Because Congress never intended to hold local gov-
ernments, much less individual citizens, to a standard of strict, joint
and several liability for the disposal of household waste, equity calls for
the clarification of the municipal liability issue.
I. STATUTORY PROVISIONS REGULATING HAZARDOUS WASTE
The primary statutory schemes for the handling, transporting, and
disposing of hazardous waste are codified in the Resource Conserva-
tion and Recovery Act (RCRA)2 6 and the Comprehensive Environ-
mental Response, Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA).27
Enacted in 1976, RCRA authorized the regulation of hazardous waste
from the time of its creation to the time of its disposal.28 RCRA failed,
however, to address the problem of abandoned or inactive waste sites.29
In response to the regulatory gaps left by RCRA, Congress in 1980
enacted CERCLA to address the concerns of hazardous waste dispo-
sal.30 The purpose of the legislation was two-fold: First, to provide for
the recognition of nationwide hazardous waste sites, known as
26. Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992k
(1988).
27. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act of
1980, 42 U.S.C. § 9601-9675 (1988).
28. H.R. REP. No. 1016, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 17 (1980), reprinted in 1980
U.S.C.C.A.N. 6119, 6120 ("[RCRA] provided a prospective cradle-to-grave regulatory
regime . . ").
29. Id. at 22 ("[RCRA] is prospective and applies to past sites only to the extent
that they are posing an imminent hazard."). See also United States v. Shell Oil Co., 605
F. Supp. 1064, 1071 (D. Colo. 1985) ("[d]eficiencies in RCRA have left important regu-
latory gaps") (quoting H.R. REP. No. 1016, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1980
U.S.C.C.A.N. 6119, 6126); United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chem. Co.,
579 F. Supp. 823, 839 (W.D. Mo. 1984) ("It was the precise inadequacies resulting from
RCRA's lack of applicability to inactive and abandoned hazardous waste disposal sites
that prompted the passage of CERCLA."), aff'd in part and rev'd in part on other
grounds, 810 F.2d 726 (8th Cir. 1986); United States v. A & F Materials Co., 578 F.
Supp. 1249, 1252 (S.D. IlI. 1984) ("RCRA does not apply to the thousands of dormant
sites that are not currently posing an imminent hazard.").
30. H.R. REP. No. 1016, supra note 28, at 17-18.
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Superfund sites;3 and second, to provide a scheme for responsive ac-
tion to protect the public health and environment from the dangers
posed by those sites.32
CERCLA delegates to EPA broad authority to contain and clean up
any hazardous substances, 33 pollutants, or contaminants that a facil-
ity34 releases or threatens to release.35  EPA or a state regulatory
agency may take necessary action to protect human health and the en-
36vironment, or it may order a private party to do so.37 Once EPA, a
state, or a private party undertakes a project, EPA may recoup the
response costs from the parties responsible for the release.3a8
31. Id. at 17. See also supra note 4 for an explanation of how hazardous sites are
identified and ranked.
32. H.R. REP. No. 1016, supra note 28, at 17.
33. CERCLA does not define hazardous substances separately. Instead, the defini-
tion incorporates by reference the pertinent provisions of other environmental acts. See
infra note 51 for the statutory language defining hazardous substances.
34. "Facility" is defined as "(A) any building, structure, installation, equipment,
pipe or pipeline.. . , or (B) any site or area where a hazardous substance has been
deposited, stored, disposed of, placed, or otherwise come to be located; but does not
include any consumer product in consumer use or any vessel." 42 U.S.C. § 9601 (9)
(1988).
35. CERCLA defines a "release" as "any spilling, leaking, pumping, pouring, emit-
ting, emptying, discharging, injecting, escaping, leaching, dumping, or disposing into
the environment.... ." 42 U.S.C. § 9601 (22) (1988).
36. 42 U.S.C. § 9604(a)(1) (1988). EPA, with authority delegated by the President,
has the discretion to take short term removal actions to protect the public from the
hazardous substances, or it may undertake a more comprehensive scheme. See 42
U.S.C. § 9601(23)-(24) (1988).
37. The EPA may issue a compliance order against a PRP, enjoining it from further
threatening the public health, welfare, or environment. 42 U.S.C. § 9606(a) (1988). If
the PRP complies with the order and takes action to cleanup the site, it may seek recov-
ery costs from the fund provided it can show, by a preponderance of the evidence, that
it was not liable. 42 U.S.C. § 9606(b)(2) (1988). Failure to comply with the order may
result in a maximum fine of $25,000 per day per violation. 42 U.S.C. § 9606(b)(1)
(1988).
38. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (1988). EPA may use money from Superfund for the
cleanup effort. If EPA abided by the National Contingency Plan (NCP) during its
cleanup action, it may subsequently sue the PRPs to recover the amount used from the
fund. See, eg., United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chem. Co., 810 F.2d
726, 747 (8th Cir. 1986) (noting that a PRP bears the burden of proving that EPA's
cleanup action was inconsistent with the NCP), cert denied, 484 U.S. 848 (1987).
The state and private parties may also take remedial action and then sue PRPs to
recover costs, but their actions too must be in accordance with the NCP. See Id. (not-
ing that burden falls on PRP to show state's response costs were inconsistent with the




CERCLA establishes liability on four categories of persons:3 9 (1) the
present owners and operators of hazardous waste sites, (2) past owners
and operators of such sites, (3) generators of hazardous waste, includ-
ing those who arrange for the disposal of hazardous substances, and (4)
transporters of the hazardous substances to the waste sites.4 Liability
is imposed without regard to fault. 1 In addition, if the environmental
harm is indivisible, responsible parties are jointly and severally liable4 2
39. See infra note 45 for the definition of "person" under CERCLA.
40. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (1988). See supra note 6 for the CERCLA definition of
"potentially responsible parties."
41. See, eg., General Elec. v. Litton Indus., 920 F.2d 1415, 1418 (8th Cir. 1990)
(CERCLA imposes strict liability); United States v. Monsanto Co., 858 F.2d 160, 170
(4th Cir. 1988) (same), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1106 (1989); Tanglewood E. Homeowners
v. Charles-Thomas, Inc., 849 F.2d 1568, 1572 (5th Cir. 1988) (same); New York v.
Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032, 1044 (2d Cir. 1985) (same); Violet v. Picillo, 648 F.
Supp. 1283, 1290 (D.R.I. 1986) (same); United States v. Conservation Chem. Co., 619
F. Supp. 162, 191 (W.D. Mo. 1985) (same); United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceuti-
cal & Chem. Co., 579 F. Supp. 823, 844 (W.D. Mo. 1984) (same); United States v.
Chem-Dyne Corp., 572 F. Supp. 802, 805 (S.D. Ohio 1983) (same); City of Philadelphia
v. Stepan Chem. Co., 544 F. Supp. 1135, 1140 n.4 (E.D. Pa. 1982) (same).
Strict liability under CERCLA is subject to certain defenses. No liability will be
found where:
a person ... can establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the release or
threat of release of a hazardous substance and the damages resulting therefrom
were caused solely by (1) an act of God; (2) an act of war; (3) an act or omission of
a third party other than an employee or agent of the defendant, or than one whose
act or omission occurs in connection with a contractual relationship ... if the
defendant establishes by a preponderance of the evidence that (a) he exercised due
care with respect to the hazardous substance concerned... , and (b) he took
precautions against foreseeable acts or omissions of any such third party ... ; or (4)
any combination of the foregoing ....
42 U.S.C. § 9607(b) (1988).
See, eg., New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032, 1048-49 (2d Cir. 1985)
(rejecting property owner's affirmative defense because the release was not caused solely
by a third party and the owner did not take precautions against foreseeable acts or
omissions); United States v. Hooker Chems. & Plastics Corp., 680 F. Supp. 546, 557-58
(W.D.N.Y. 1988) (rejecting chemical company's defense claim because of its contrac-
tual relationship with the responsible third parties).
42. Joint and several liability is imposed by judicial discretion. Ferrey, supra note 3,
at 234-35. See, eg., United States v. R. W. Meyer, Inc., 889 F.2d 1497, 1506-08 (6th
Cir. 1989) (holding that to the extent the harm is indivisible, the property owner and
operator of facility and its present owner would be jointly and severally liable), cert.
denied 494 U.S. 1057 (1990); O'Neil v. Picillo, 883 F.2d 176, 178-180 (1st Cir. 1989)
(holding that generators of hazardous waste would be held jointly and severally liable
due to the indivisibility of removal costs), cert denied 493 U.S. 1071 (1990).
CERCLA's drafters contemplated a joint and several liability approach, but after
receiving heavy criticism, they rejected it. 126 CONG. REc. 30,972 (1980) (statement of
Sen. Helms). Legislators thought that the joint and several method of liability imposed
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for any costs incurred.4 3
CERCLA's liability scheme does not expressly exempt municipali-
ties.' In fact, the language of CERCLA includes municipalities in its
definition of the term "person."4 5 Thus, liability may be imposed46
provided municipalities have engaged sufficiently in the characteristic
activities of generators.4 7 Municipalities traditionally have chosen one
of the following approaches to deal with MSW: (1) collect and trans-
port MSW to disposal sites or landfills; (2) collect MSW from resi-
dences, unload it at a transfer station, and contract with a third party
to transport it to a disposal site or landfill; (3) contract with third par-
ties for residential collection and transportation to a disposal site; or (4)
provide no collection services, thereby requiring its residents to dispose
of their own waste.48 Under all but the last of these approaches, mu-
nicipalities "arrange for" the disposal of waste and therefore may fall
within the purview of CERCLA's definition of generator.4 9
too great of a burden, for it would unreasonably require those small contributors to bear
the entire cost of the cleanup. See 126 CONG. Rac. 26,786 (1980) (statement of Rep.
Stockman).
43. The parties are liable for the government's cost of removal or remedial action,
damages to natural resources, the cost of any health assessment done pursuant to CER-
CLA authorization, as well as any other necessary response costs expended. 42 U.S.C.
§ 9607(a)(4)(A)-(D) (1988).
44. Under very narrow circumstances, a municipality may be exempt from liability
under CERCLA as an owner or operator if the municipality's only connection to the
site is that it owned or operated the site and acquired ownership or control involuntarily
by virtue of its sovereign function. See 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(D) (1988).
45. CERCLA defines person as "an individual, firm, corporation, association, part-
nership, consortium, joint venture, commercial entity, United States Government,
State, municipality, commission, political subdivision of a State, or any interstate body."
42 U.S.C. § 9601(21) (1988) (emphasis added).
46. In general, to maintain an action under CERCLA, plaintiff's prima facie case
must show that: (1) defendant fits one of the four classes of responsible parties outlined
in § 9607(a); (2) the site is a facility; (3) there is a release or threatened release of haz-
ardous substances at the facility; (4) the plaintiff incurred costs responding to the release
or threatened release; and (5) the costs and response actions conform to the NCP. See
B.F. Goodrich v. Murtha, 958 F.2d 1192, 1198 (2d Cir. 1992); New York v. Shore
Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032, 1043 (2d Cir. 1985).
47. Section 107(a) of CERCLA defines a generator as:
any person who by contract, agreement, or otherwise arranged for disposal or
treatment, or arranged with a transporter for transport for disposal or treatment, of
hazardous substances owned or possessed by such person, by any other party or
entity, at any facility ... owned or operated by another party or entity and contain-
ing such hazardous substances ....
48. Ferrey, supra note 3, at 233.
49. See supra note 47 for the definition of "generator." See also EPA Interim Policy,
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Municipal liability as generators is, however, dependent on MSW
containing hazardous substances."0 The language of CERCLA does
not specifically apply to MSW. 1 Instead, the definition of hazardous
substances includes those substances designated as hazardous in other
environmental acts52 or those designated by EPA, pursuant to section
102 of CERCLA, as potentially dangerous to the public health and
welfare or the environment.5 3
Because CERCLA incorporates RCRA, those substances designated
as hazardous wastes under RCRA qualify as hazardous substances
under CERCLA 4 RCRA defines hazardous waste as "a solid waste
supra note 10, at 51,074 ("Municipalities may... be PRPs as part of CERCLA's broad
definition of who is potentially liable.").
50. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(3) (1988). See supra note 6 for the statutory language on
PRP liability and note 46 for the elements of a prima facie case under CERCLA.
51. The statutory definition of hazardous substances includes:
(A) any substance designated pursuant to section 1321(b)(2)(A) of title 33 [the
Federal Water Pollution Control Act], (B) any element, compound, mixture, solu-
tion, or substance designated pursuant to section 9602 of this title, (C) any hazard-
ous waste having the characteristics identified under or listed pursuant to section
3001 of the Solid Waste Disposal Act [also known as RCRA] (but not including
any waste the regulation of which under the Solid Waste Disposal Act has been
suspended by Act of Congress), (D) any toxic pollutant listed under section
1317(a) of title 33 [the Federal Water Pollution Control Act], (E) any hazardous
air pollutant listed under section 112 of the Clean Air Act, and (F) any imminently
hazardous chemical substance or mixture with respect to which the Administrator
has taken action pursuant to section 2606 of the title 15 [the Toxic Substances
Control Act]. The term does not include petroleum, including crude oil or any
fraction thereof which is not otherwise specifically listed or designated as a hazard-
ous substance under subparagraphs (A) through (F) of this paragraph, and the
term does not include natural gas, natural gas liquids, liquefied natural gas, or
synthetic gas usable for fuel (or mixtures of natural gas and such synthetic gas).
42 U.S.C. § 9601(14) (1988) (citations omitted).
52. Courts have interpreted the definition to mean that if a substance falls under any
of the stated statutory sections, then it is a hazardous substance under CERCLA. See,
e.g., Eagle-Pitcher Indust. v. United States EPA, 759 F.2d 922, 930 (D.C. Cir. 1985)
(holding that even if a substance falls within one exception, it is still a hazardous sub-
stance if it falls within another provision).
53. Pursuant to § 9602, and as adopted by reference in subsection (B) of § 9601(14),
EPA has published a list of over 700 designated hazardous substances and their requi-
site quantities. See 40 C.F.R. pt. 302 (1991). For the exact language of § 9601(14), see
supra note 51.
54. See 42 U.S.C. § 9601(14)(C) (1988). Under RCRA, EPA adopted two distinct
regulatory schemes for the treatment of waste and the operation of waste storage and
disposal facilities: Subtitle D, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6941-49a (1988) regulates nonhazardous
solid waste, Subtitle C, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6921-39b (1988), regulates hazardous waste. Reg-
ulation under Subtitle C of RCRA is more stringent than under Subtitle D. See H.R.
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which might contribute to increased mortality or illness, or might pose
a substantial hazard to human health or the environment." 55 House-
hold waste, the principal component of MSW,5 6 is exempt from cover-
age as a hazardous waste under RCRA. 7 Relying on the RCRA
exemption, municipalities allege that an exemption for MSW has there-
fore been incorporated into the CERCLA definition of hazardous sub-
stances.58  Yet, EPA,59  courts,6°  and other authorities6  have
REP. No. 1016, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. I, at 17, reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6119,
6120 (noting that only hazardous wastes are subject to the strict standards of the "cra-
dle-to-grave regulatory regime [of Subtitle C").
55. 42 U.S.C. § 6903(5) (1988). The definition of solid waste includes "any garbage,
refuse, sludge.., and other discarded material." 42 U.S.C. § 6903(27)(1988).
Pursuant to its authority under RCRA, 42 U.S.C. § 6921 (1988), EPA has compiled
a list of those chemicals and chemical compounds that are potentially hazardous. 40
C.F.R. § 261.30-.33 (1991).
56. See supra note 10 for EPA's definition of MSW.
57. 42 U.S.C. § 6921(i) (1988) and 40 C.F.R. § 261.4(b)(1) (1991). RCRA defines
household wastes as "any waste material (including garbage, trash and sanitary wastes
in septic tanks) derived from households (including single and multiple residences, ho-
tels and motels, bunkhouses, range stations, crew quarters, campgrounds, picnic
grounds and day-use recreation areas)." 40 C.F.R. § 261.4(b)(1) (1991).
Because household waste is not considered a hazardous waste, RCRA requires those
who collect and dispose of household waste to follow the dictates of Subtitle D, as
opposed to the more stringent requirements of Subtitle C. See 42 U.S.C. § 6941-49a
(1988). See also EPA Interim Policy, supra note 10, at 51,074 n.3 ("All household
wastes, including household hazardous wastes, are unconditionally exempt from the
Federal hazardous waste regulations promulgated under subtitle C of RCRA."). Subti-
tle D requires that MSW be disposed of in sanitary landfills or in an environmentally
sound manner. 42 U.S.C. § 6943(a)(2).
58. See Brief for Appellants Connecticut Municipal/Government Agency Solid
Waste Collectors Group at 29-35, B.F. Goodrich Co. v. Murtha, 958 F.2d 1192 (2d Cir.
1992) (No. 91-7450) [hereinafter Appellants' Brief]; Memorandum in Support of Mo-
tion for Summary Judgment Filed on Behalf of the Defendant Municipal/Government
Agency Collectors Group at 37-40, B.F. Goodrich Co. v. Murtha, 754 F. Supp. 960 (D.
Conn. 1991) (No. N-87-52) [hereinafter Municipal Defendants' Memorandum]. See
also infra notes 92-115 and accompanying text discussing B.F Goodrich.
59. EPA Interim Policy, supra note 10, at 51,074 ("(CERCLA) does not provide an
exemption from liability for municipal wastes.").
60. See, e.g., B.F. Goodrich Co. v. Murtha, 958 F.2d 1192, 1203 (2d Cir. 1992),
aff'g 754 F. Supp. 960 (D. Conn. 1991); Transportation Leasing Co. v. California, No.
89-7368, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18,193, at 4-7 (C.D. Cal. 1990). These cases are dis-
cussed in Part III of this Note.
61. See Ferrey, supra note 3, at 262-67 (addressing the statutory language and judi-
cial interpretations of RCRA and CERCLA and concluding that MSW is not exempt);
Molly A. Meegan, Note, Municipal Liability for Household Hazardous Waste: An Anal-
ysis of the Superfund Statute and Its Policy Implications, 79 GEO. L.J. 1783, 1788-89
(1991) (arguing that household waste contains elements that qualify as hazardous sub-
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concluded that MSW is not exempt from CERCLA. Under these in-
terpretations, to the extent that MSW contains a hazardous substance
under CERCLA, albeit minute, and to the extent that there is a release
or threatened release,6 2 liability may attach.63 The question then be-
comes to what degree are municipalities liable.
II. EPA's Policies on Municipal Liability
A. Municipal Settlement Policy
Acknowledging the vulnerability of municipalities for the cleanup
costs of waste sites, EPA in December 1989 issued an Interim Munici-
pal Settlement Policy, which describes the approach EPA officials
should take when a municipality is potentially responsible for the re-
lease of hazardous substances at a site."4 According to the policy,
CERCLA does not exempt municipalities from liability if they fall
within one of the categories of PRPs under section 107(a) of CER-
CLA.65 In addition, EPA noted that some MSW may contain poten-
tial CERCLA hazardous substances.6 6 Nonetheless, EPA's general
policy is to exempt municipalities from liability under Superfund for
MSW, regardless of whether the waste contains household hazardous
waste,67 unless the hazardous substances come from commercial or in-
stances and commenting that had Congress intended to exempt such waste from liabil-
ity it would have done so expressly).
62. See supra note 35 for the definition of "release" under CERCLA.
63. See EPA Interim Policy, supra note 10, at 51,074. EPA acknowledges that
"[MSW is] generally characterized by large volumes of non-hazardous substances and
my [sic] contain small quantities of household hazardous or other wastes, although the
actual composition of the waste streams vary [sic] considerably at individual sites." Id.
64. Id. at 51,071. The policy is a product of nearly two years of research by EPA.
Paul G. Wallach & Mark K. Atlas, EPA's CERCLA Municipal Settlement Policy, I
SHEPARD'S ENVTL. LIAB. IN COM. TRANSACTIONS REP. 137, 137 (1991). Until the
policy's issuance, EPA enforced liability on municipalities inconsistently. Michelle L.
Washington, Note, A Proposed Scheme of Municipal Waste-Generator Liability, 100
YALE L.J. 805, 812 (1990). Cf. EPA Interim Policy, supra note 10, at 51,071 ("Until the
development of this interim policy, EPA had not addressed [municipal involvement in
the Superfund settlement process] from a national perspective.").
65. EPA Interim Policy, supra note 10, at 51,074. See supra note 6 for the text of
section 107(a) of CERCLA.
66. EPA Interim Policy, supra note 10, at 51,074.
67. EPA refers to "household hazardous waste" as those wastes generated by
households that would be dealt with as hazardous wastes under subtitle C of RCRA if a
non-household generated them in quantities which would make them ineligible for the
small quantity generator exception. Id. at 51,074 n.3.
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dustrial processes.6"
Other clarifications brought out in the policy include EPA's position
with respect to information gathering, notification of potential respon-
sibility, and settlement proceedings. 69 First, EPA made known that it
will include municipalities in the Agency's information gathering activ-
ities.7° Accordingly, municipalities, like private parties, will be issued
information request letters under section 104(e) of CERCLA.71 From
the information obtained, EPA may determine whether the waste sent
to the site contained CERCLA hazardous substances.72 EPA is then
able to determine whether the party should be notified that it may be a
pRp.73
Second, EPA will generally treat municipalities and private PRPs
alike for notification purposes.7 4 As a threshold matter, however, EPA
68. Id. at 51,072. See infra notes 75-78 and accompanying text for a description of
waste stream assessment and consequent liability. EPA came to its decision on how to
treat MSW after analyzing the cost effectiveness of imposing liability. EPA Interim
Policy, supra note 10, at 51,073. Realizing that Superfund's policies would be better
served by pursuing other PRPs, EPA provided municipalities with the limited exemp-
tion. Id. See infra note 179 for a direct quotation of EPA's reasoning.
EPA justifies its approach to municipal liability as an exercise of the Agency's en-
forcement discretion. EPA Interim Policy, supra note 10, at 51,073. Section 122(e)(1)
provides that "(w)henever the President determines that a period of negotiation under
this subsection would facilitate an agreement with potentially responsible parties for
taking response action... and would expedite remedial action, the President shall so
notify all such parties and shall provide them with information concerning each of the
following... ." 42 U.S.C. § 9622(e)(1) (1988). Some commentators disagree with the
Agency's broad interpretation of its discretion under § 122(e)(1). See Paul G. Wallach
& Mark Atlas, CERCLA Municipal Settlement Policy: EPA Enforcement Indiscretion,
20 ENV'T REP. (BNA) 1854, 1854 (1990) (asserting that the Legislature refused to give
EPA discretionary authority, and even if EPA had the discretion, it was abused in this
instance); Washington, supra note 64, at 812-14 (criticizing EPA's policy as being dis-
criminatory and contrary to legislative intent).
69. EPA Interim Policy, supra note 10, at 51,074-76.
70. Id. at 51,074.
71. Id. EPA's authority to request information is designated in 42 U.S.C. § 9604(e)
(Supp. V 1988). Receiving a "104(e)" information request letter is the start of the en-
forcement process. The letter requires the PRP to provide the government with all
pertinent information relating to the site.
72. EPA Interim Policy, supra note 10, at 51,074. EPA will also accept site specific
information from other parties to supplement its own efforts. Id. at 51,074 n.6.
73. Id. at 51,074. Cf. infra notes 86-89 and accompanying text discussing EPA's
policy of sending non-notice letters to municipal non-PRPs.
74. EPA Interim Policy, supra note 10, at 51,074-75. As owner/operators or past
owner/operators, municipalities will be notified just like similarly situated private par-
ties. Id. at 51,074. Municipalities will also receive like treatment as genera-
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will not notify municipalities, as generators or transporters, unless it
obtains site-specific information" that the MSW contains a hazardous
substance that derived from commercial, institutional, or industrial
processes.76 As an exception to this rule," EPA may notify generators
or transporters of MSW which contain a hazardous substance derived
only from households when the total contribution of commercial, insti-
tutional, and industrial hazardous waste by private parties is insignifi-
cant when compared to the MSW generated or transported to the site
by municipalities.78
Third, once EPA has notified all PRPs, its goal and process for
reaching settlement at sites involving municipalities or MSW is the
same as for other sites.7 9 This goal is to reach one settlement agree-
ment which, consistent with the law and EPA policies, completely in-
corporates all pending CERCLA claims.80 Accordingly, EPA will try
tor/transporter PRPs of hazardous substances once the substances have been
scrutinized. See infra notes 75-78 and accompanying text for discussion of EPA's ap-
proach to scrutinizing MSW.
75. By site-specific information, the EPA means information pertaining to that par-
ticular Superfund site. It does not include "general studies" drawing conclusions about
whether MSW typically contains a certain amount of CERCLA hazardous substances,
unless these studies pertain to "site-specific information" obtained from PRPs or the
Superfund site at issue. The "general studies," however, may be used as supplemental
material. EPA Interim Policy, supra note 10, at 51,075 n.8.
76. Id. at 51,075. 'This [policy] means [that] EPA will not generally notify...
generators [and/or] transporters of MSW [as PRPs] if only household hazardous wastes
are present." Id. If EPA has information that hazardous substances derive from par-
ticular non-household sources, such parties may be notified as PRPs. "Non-household
sources" refers to small quantity generator waste from commercial or industrial
processes or waste from private or municipally owned maintenance shops. Id.
77. EPA expects this exception to be applied sparingly and only in "truly excep-
tional situations." Id. at 51,072, 51,075.
78. EPA Interim Policy, supra note 10, at 51,075. To aid the regional offices in
coming to this determination, the policy states:
The Regions should consider both the volume and the toxicity of the commercial,
institutional, and industrial hazardous waste when determining whether it is insig-
nificant when compared to the MSW. In determining whether the volume is insig-
nificant, the Regions should consider the total volume of such waste contributed by
all private parties. In determining whether the toxicity is insignificant, the Regions
should consider whether such waste is significantly more toxic than the MSW and
whether such waste requires a disproportionately high treatment and disposal cost
or requires a different or more costly remedial technique than that which otherwise
would be technically adequate for the site.
Id. at 51,075 n.10.
79. Id. at 51,075.
80. Id.
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to include all municipal and private PRPs in the same settlement
agreement."1 Although municipalities may seek de minimis settle-
ments82 or special financial arrangements when appropriate,8 3 the pol-
icy does not provide any protection against third party lawsuits
brought by other parties.84 The only option for avoiding cost-recovery
suits from other PRPs is to enter into a settlement with EPA and ob-
tain contribution protection under section 113(f) of CERCLA.85
B. Non-Notice Letters to Local Governments
In an effort to aid municipalities, EPA developed a policy of sending
"non-notice" letters to local governments.86 The letters provide infor-
mation about potential Superfund actions in the local government's
area in which it might have an interest.8 7 Designed for those local
governments that EPA does not consider PRPs, the letters put the mu-
nicipality on notice of other named PRPs that may bring actions
81. EPA Interim Policy, supra note 10, at 51,075.
82. Under section 122(g), de minimis settlements are available. A municipality set-
tling under § 122(g) will be held responsible for only a minimal share of the overall
cleanup cost. See 42 U.S.C. § 9622(g)(1) (1988). More recently, EPA announced a spe-
cial settlement policy for "de micromis" parties, or very small parties. EPA Moves to
Protect Very Small Business from Superfund Cleanup Costs, INSIDE E.P.A., Nov. 15,
1991, at 1, 9-10.
83. EPA notes that some settlement provisions may be especially appropriate for
municipalities. These include options for delayed payments, payments over time, and
in-kind contributions. Such provisions would take into account their status as govern-
mental entities which could limit their abilities to fulfill their obligations as PRPs. See
EPA Interim Policy, supra note 10, at 51,075-76.
84. Id. at 51,076.
85. Id. Under section 113(f), EPA has the authority to provide contribution pro-
tection to those settling parties. This is an option available to parties who have not been
notified as PRPs by EPA but who would like to settle any potential liability. Id. at
51,076, n.15. See infra notes 86-89 and accompanying text for a discussion of EPA's
policy of sending non-notice letters, which could induce local governments to go to
EPA to settle under section 113(f).
86. EPA to Give Heads-up to Towns in Non-notice Letters, INSIDE EPA's
SUPERFUND REPORT, Jan. 30, 1991, at 1 [hereinafter Non-notice letters]. Note that
"non-notice letters" is an unofficial name for the document.
Requests from local government organizations, including the International City Man-
agers Association, prompted the decision to issue the letters. Id. Local governments
felt that they were at a disadvantage in settlement negotiations due to their unawareness
of EPA's involvement with PRPs at the Superfund site. Id. Cf. Steinzor, supra note 4,
at 81 (noting that lack of information and understanding of Superfund litigation disad-
vantaged local governments).
87. Non-notice letters, supra note 86, at 1.
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against them for contribution."8 Upon receiving the letter, a local gov-
ernment may be persuaded to seek a settlement with EPA, which has
the effect of barring third party suits by other PRPs for cost recovery.8 9
III. JUDICIAL DECISIONS
In two recent decisions, B.E Goodrich Co. v. Murtha 9I and Trans-
portation Leasing Co. v. California,91 federal courts held that CER-
CLA's liability scheme does not exempt municipalities as generators of
MSW.
A. B.F Goodrich Co. v. Murtha
B.F. Goodrich Co. v. Murtha involved two Connecticut Superfund
sites, both of which had accepted municipal and industrial wastes.92
EPA negotiated a $20 million settlement with the industrial PRPs,
which included B.F. Goodrich, Uniroyal Chemical Company and
thirty other companies.93 These companies subsequently filed suit
against Murtha and other entities, the alleged owners or operators of
the landfills, for the cleanup costs.94 Murtha then fied a contribution
suit against approximately two hundred parties, including twenty-four
municipalities and local government agencies.95 The corporate plain-
tiffs fied amended complaints to add the municipalities as defend-
88. Id. Unlike § 122(e)(1) notice letters, which are sent to PRPs, the non-notice
letters are not a notice of potential liability. In practice, the non-notice letters will be
sent at the same time that regular notice letters are sent to PRPs. Id.
89. Id. See supra note 85 and accompanying text for an explanation of possible
contribution protection.
EPA has no record of how many non-notice letters were sent in 1991. Telephone
Interview with Maria T. Bywater, Office of Waste Programs Enforcement, U.S. Envi-
ronmental Protection Agency (Feb. 27, 1992).
90. 958 F.2d 1192 (2d Cir. 1992), aff'g 754 F. Supp. 960 (D. Conn. 1991).
91. No. 89-7368, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18,193 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 5, 1990).
92. One of the sites, Laurel Park Landfill, was listed as the 85th site on EPA's
February 1991 NPL. 40 C.F.R. pt. 300 at 196 (1991). The February 1991 NPL ranked
the other site, Beacon Heights Landfill, as the 265th worst site. Id. at 199.
93. See Norman A. Dupont, Municipal Solid Waste: The Endless Disposal ofAmer-
ican Municipalities Meets the CERCLA Strict Liability Dragon, 24 Loy. L.A. L. REV.
1183, 1190 (1991).
94. B.E Goodrich, 958 F.2d at 1196. EPA brought four separate cases against the
State of Connecticut Department of Environmental Protection, B.F. Goodrich, and
Uniroyal. The four actions were consolidated. Id.
95. Id. at 1196. For a list of the twenty-four municipal defendants, see Appellants'
Brief, supra note 58, at 2 n.2.
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ants." The municipalities then moved for summary judgment, arguing
that the generation and collection of MSW does not trigger liability
under CERCLA.97
On appeal from the district court's denial of summary judgment,98
the municipalities argued that they cannot be liable under section
9607(a)(3) of CERCLA99 because MSW, for which they allegedly ar-
ranged disposal, is not a hazardous substance. °° In support, the mu-
nicipal appellants advanced four grounds to exclude MSW from
CERCLA's purview. The municipalities' argument was as follows: (1)
CERCLA does not address the issue of MSW, therefore, any construc-
tion should conform with its legislative history and EPA interpreta-
tions, 1 (2) the legislative history reflects an intent to charge industry,
not the taxpayers, with the cleanup costs, 02 (3) in light of the forego-
ing, EPA formulated its Municipal Policy so as to create a rebuttable
presumption that MSW is non-hazardous O3-rebutted when there is
site specific information that MSW contains hazardous substances de-
rived from commercial or industrial processes,"° and (4) because
CERCLA incorporates RCRA hazardous wastes and RCRA excludes
household waste from its definition of hazardous waste, CERCLA im-
96. B.F. Goodrich Co. v. Murtha, 754 F. Supp. 960, 962 & n.3 (D. Conn. 1991). The
companies' amended complaint added 388 parties to the suit. Id. at n.5.
97. B.F. Goodrich, 958 F.2d at 1197.
98. The U.S. District Court for the District of Connecticut denied the municipal
defendants' motion for summary judgment in an order dated January 8, 1991. B.F.
Goodrich Co. v. Murtha, 754 F. Supp. 960 (D. Conn. 1991). The municipalities then
filed a Petition for Permission to Appeal from Interlocutory Order with the U.S. Circuit
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. Appellants' Brief, supra note 58, at 3. Permis-
sion to appeal was granted on May 8, 1991. Id.
99. See supra note 6 for the text of the statute.
100. B.F Goodrich, 958 F.2d at 1199-1201.
101. Appellants' Brief, supra note 58, at 14-16.
102. Id. at 17. The fact that in creating the Superfund Congress chose to collect its
revenue from predominantly industrial sources supports this argument. See id. at 18
n.14 for a discussion of Superfund's revenue base.
103. The reverse of this premise creates a rebuttable presumption that waste from a
commercial or industrial source contains hazardous substances. This presumption
could be rebutted by proof that the waste is "the compositional equivalent of household-
type waste." Id. at 26.
104. Id. at 25-29. The presumption may also be rebutted in those "truly excep-
tional" scenarios where the MSW contains hazardous substances from household
sources and where total contribution of commercial or industrial waste is insignificant
in comparison with municipal waste. See supra notes 77-78 and accompanying text
describing the use of this exception.
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plicitly excludes MSW from CERCLA's definition of hazardous sub-
stances.10 5 Furthermore, because courts should construe CERCLA
and RCRA to compliment each other, and acknowledging the fact that
RCRA considers MSW non-hazardous, the logical conclusion is that
MSW should not be considered hazardous under CERCLA.10 6
Upon reviewing the arguments that the municipal appellants ad-
vanced, the Second Circuit held that CERCLA's definition of hazard-
ous substances included MSW, and therefore the municipalities were
not exempt from CERCLA liability.010 In coming to this result, the
court first reviewed the language of CERCLA itself and noted that
CERCLA does not differentiate liability based on the PRP or the
source of the particular waste.10 8 Focusing next on RCRA, the court
rejected the municipalities' contention that MSW is not a "hazardous
substance" under CERCLA due to RCRA's household waste exclu-
sion. 109 The court noted that Congress intended the RCRA exemption
to apply narrowly 1 ° and in no way to limit CERCLA's definition of
hazardous substances. 1 Additionally, when enacting CERCLA,
Congress was cognizant of RCRA and could have excluded household
waste from CERCLA liability as it did for petroleum and natural
105. Appellants' Brief, supra note 58, at 29-35. The municipalities made this argu-
ment by first noting that households generate the MSW. RCRA excludes household
waste from its definition of hazardous waste. Accordingly, as referred to in
§ 9601(14)(C) of CERCLA, CERCLA incorporates RCRA's household waste exclu-
sion. See supra notes 54-56 and accompanying text and supra note 51 (discussing
RCRA's and CERCLA's respective definitions of hazardous wastes and substances).
106. Appellants' Brief, supra note 58, at 36-43.
107. B. Goodrich, 958 F.2d at 1206.
108. Id. at 1200. In addition, the court noted that CERCLA liability was also not
contingent on quantity or concentration. Id.
109. Id. at 1201-03.
110. Id. at 1201-02. The household waste exclusion was meant to exempt such
waste from the stringent standards required for the daily management of waste under
RCRA. Id. at 1202.
111. B.F Goodrich, 958 F.2d at 1202. The court also distinguished treatment of
MSW under the two statutory schemes by pointing out that RCRA applies to hazard-
ous waste, while CERCLA applies to hazardous substances. Id. Additionally, RCRA
takes into consideration certain threshold quantities or concentrations. Id. CERCLA,
in contrast, does not consider quantity or concentration as relevant to defining hazard-
ous substances. Id.
Analogizing RCRA's household waste exclusion with other waste exclusions, for ex-
ample the mining waste exclusion, the court noted that the courts addressing the latter
have refused to incorporate such an exclusion into CERCLA. Id. at 1203 (citing Eagle-
Picher Indus. v. EPA, 759 F.2d 922, 927 (D.C. Cir. 1985)).
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gas.112 Instead, the court reasoned, Congress intended CERCLA's
definition of hazardous substances to be broad and not dependent on
the source of the waste." 3 Thus, if the MSW, including household
waste, contains hazardous substances, and a release or threatened re-
lease occurs, the municipalities may be liable. 1 4 To avoid an unfair
result, the courts may take equitable factors into consideration in order
to allocate costs among the municipal and industrial generators based
on the extent to which each caused damage.11 5
B. Transportation Leasing Co. v. California
In Transportation Leasing Co. v. California,'16 sixty-four corpora-
tions named as PRPs filed a third party lawsuit against a number of
local governments." 7 The municipalities filed a motion for an order
specifying certain issues as without substantial controversy."1 8 The
municipalities asserted two defenses. First, they argued that merely
issuing a business license or franchise to independent waste haulers to
conduct business and collect rubbish within the city does not constitute
an "arrangement" for the disposal of waste under section 107(a)(3) of
112. Id. at 1203. See supra note 51 for the definition of hazardous substance under
CERCLA and its exclusion of petroleum and natural gas.
113. B.F Goodrich, 958 F.2d at 1200.
114. The court came to this conclusion after considering the legislative history,
scant as it is, and EPA's interpretations of this history. See id. at 1203-06.
115. Id. at 1206. The equitable factors that the courts may consider include "the
relative volume and toxicity of the substances for disposal of which the municipalities
arranged, the relative cleanup costs incurred as a result of these wastes, the degree of
care exercised by each party with respect to the hazardous substances, and the financial
resources of the parties involved." Id.
116. No. 89-7368, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18,193 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 5, 1990).
117. Dupont, supra note 93, at 1195. The landfill involved in the suit, the Operat-
ing Industries, Inc. landfill, ranked number 101 on EPA's February 1991 NPL. 40
C.F.R. pt. 300 app. B at 196 (1991). While in operation, the landfill accepted "indus-
trial solid, liquid and hazardous wastes and municipal trash." Dupont, supra note 93,
at 1195 (citing Partial Consent Decree, United States v. Chevron Chem. Co., No. 88-
7186, slip op. at para. IV(A) (C.D. Cal. May 11, 1989)). EPA entered a settlement
decree with 181 private corporations named as PRPs for an estimated $34 million in
remedial work. Dupont, supra note 93, at 1195. Sixty-four of these corporations subse-
quently sought contribution from the local governments. Id.
Plaintiffs originally requested the municipalities to pay 90% of the estimated $66
million cleanup cost. Telephone Interview with Kevin Murphy, City Manager of Al-
hambra, California (Feb. 26, 1992). This allocation would be based on volume. Id.
118. Transportation Leasing, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18,193, at *1-2.
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CERCLA.119 Second, the cities sought a declaration that rubbish gen-
erated by residences and businesses is not a "hazardous substance" as
defined by CERCLA.1 20 As in B.F. Goodrich Co. v. Murtha,12 1 the
cities argued that CERCLA impliedly incorporated the RCRA exclu-
sion for household waste.
12 2
The U.S. District Court for the Central District of California de-
clined to decide the cities' first claim and found their second argument
meritless. 123 The court stated that "it does not necessarily follow that
the RCRA exclusion for household waste compels the conclusion that
household waste cannot be a 'hazardous substance' under ... CER-
CLA." 124 Like the court in B.E Goodrich, the Transportation Leasing
court noted that if Congress intended to exclude household waste
under CERCLA, it would have done so explicitly in the Act.125 Ac-
cordingly, the court ruled that CERCLA does not expressly exempt
from liability the disposal of household waste. 126 The court made it
known, however, that the plaintiffs carried the burden of showing that
the waste disposed of at the site contained hazardous substances as de-
fined under CERCLA.
127
119. Id. To further this argument, the city pointed out that it was issuing the busi-
ness licenses pursuant to its police power to protect the public health and safety. Id. at
*2.
120. Id.
121. 958 F.2d 1192 (2d Cir. 1992), affjg 754 F. Supp. 960 (D. Conn. 1991). See
supra notes 109-114 and accompanying text for the B.E Goodrich court's analysis of the
argument that MSW is exempt from CERCLA's definition of hazardous substances by
the RCRA household waste exclusion.
122. Transportation Leasing, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18,193, at *4.
123. Id. at *3-4.
124. Id. at *4.
125. Id. at *4-5. See supra note 112 and accompanying text for the B.F Goodrich
court's analysis of this issue.
126. Transportation Leasing, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18,193, at *7. In coming to its
decision, the court cited an EPA Directive which made known that, "CERCLA does
not contain an exclusion from liability for household waste or an exclusion based on the
amount of waste generated.... If a household waste contains a substance that is cov-
ered under these CERCLA sections (whether or not it is a RCRA hazardous waste),
potential CERCLA liability exists." Id. at *6 (citing Clarification of Issues Pertaining to
Household Hazardous Waste Collection Programs, OFFICE OF SOLID WASTE AND
EMERGENCY RESPONSE, U.S. EPA Directive No. 9574.00-1 (1988)).
127. Transportation Leasing, 1990 U.S. Dist. Lexis 18,193, at *7.
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IV. CONGRESSIONAL BILLS
Considering the holdings of B.F. Goodrich Co. v. Murtha'28 and
Transportation Leasing Co. v. California,'2 9 municipalities now con-
front the harsh reality of joint and several liability under CERCLA for
the disposal of MSW. Having failed to obtain relief from the judiciary,
local governments are attempting to find solace in the Legislature. 3
The issue of municipal liability has led municipalities to seek congres-
sional support for legislative action to protect local governments.1 31
The local government lobby effort has resulted in the introduction of
bills in both houses of Congress to amend CERCLA to protect munici-
palities from liability. 132
Senators Lautenberg (D-NJ) and Wirth (D-CO) introduced the
Toxic Cleanup Equity and Acceleration Act (TCEAA) in the Sen-
ate.' 33 A similar bill,, under the same title, was introduced in the
House by Congressmen Dreier (R-CA) and Torricelli (D-NJ).134
128. 958 F.2d 1192 (2d Cir. 1992), aff'g 754 F. Supp. 960 (D. Conn. 1991).
129. No. 89-7368, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18,193 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 5, 1990).
130. Municipalities nationwide have joined together to form a coalition, the Ameri-
can Communities for Cleanup Equity (ACCE), to lobby Congress for legislative action
to protect local governments. Telephone Interview with Jocelyn Guyer, Lobbyist for
American Communities for Cleanup Equity (Jan. 13, 1992). As of January 1992,
ACCE membership included 106 municipalities.
Other groups supporting the legislation to protect municipalities include the U.S.
Conference of Mayors, National Association of Counties, Sierra Club, Natural Re-
sources Defense Council, Clean Water Action, Environmental Defense Fund, and the
U.S. Public Interest Research Group, known as PIRG. Id.
131. ACCE initially advanced a proposed amendment to RCRA which would have
declared MSW non-hazardous, thereby creating a blanket exemption from Superfund.
See Major Municipal Lobby Joins Battle to Exempt Cities from Superfund Costs, INSIDE
E.P.A., Dec. 14, 1990, at 10. Subsequently, however, ACCE revised its agenda to ex-
clude the blanket exemption for MSW. See Cities Seeking Protection from Superfund
Drop Call for Blanket MSWExemption, INSIDE E.P.A., June 28, 1991, at 11. Instead, a
compromise resulted in a legislative proposal to proscribe industries from filing suits for
contribution against municipalities. See infra notes 133-50 discussing the Toxic
Cleanup Equity and Acceleration Act.
132. See S. 1557, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991); H.R. 2767, 102d Cong., 1st Sess.
(1991); H.R. 3026, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991). See also infra note 151 (describing
attempts to limit municipal liability through an amendment to the Government-Spon-
sored Enterprises bill).
133. See 137 CONG. REc. S10,952 (daily ed. July 25, 1991) (statement of Sen.
Lautenberg).
134. See 137 CONG. REC. H5817 (daily ed. July 24, 1991) (statement of Rep. Tor-
ricelli). The language of the House bill, H.R. 3026, is slightly different than the Senate
version, S. 1557. The notable difference is an added "Findings" section in the House
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TCEAA would amend CERCLA to restrict lawsuits by third parties
against municipalities that generate and transport MSW to Superfund
sites, while leaving unaffected municipal liability as owners or
operators.13
5
The legislation would modify Superfund litigation in two respects;
first, it would proscribe third party suits against municipalities by any
party other than the government, and second, it would codify EPA's
Interim Municipal Settlement Policy. 136 The specific statutory scheme
includes: findings concerning the current problems of Superfund litiga-
tion; additional definitions; limits on Third party suits for MSW; set-
tlement provisions; and retroactive application. 137
Section 2 of TCEAA states the following findings: (1) there is a need
to reaffirm the Superfund principle that the polluter should pay for
cleanup; (2) Congress did not intend to hold municipalities strictly,
jointly, and severally liable; (3) the toxicity of MSW averages less than
0.5%; (4) third party contribution suits distort the intent of Superfind
and delay cleanup; and (5) spurious litigation needs to be stopped. 13
Section 3 would amend CERCLA to add the definition of MSW,
while leaving all other definitions under CERCLA intact. 139 MSW is
defined as "all waste materials generated by households" including but
not limited to food, yard waste, paper, clothing, appliances, consumer
product packaging and diapers, as well as household hazardous
waste." The term includes all components of MSW, even though
bill. For purposes of analysis in this section of the Note, all references will be made to
the House version of the Toxic Cleanup Equity and Acceleration Act of 1991.
135. Id. Rep. Christopher H. Smith (R-N.J.) introduced the other piece of legisla-
tion. H.R. 2767. H.R. 2767 proposes an alternate amendment to CERCLA. This bill,
titled the Toxic Pollution Responsibility Act of 1991, provides that municipalities
should be exempt from CERCLA liability for the generation or transportation of MSW.
See H.R. 2767, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991).
136. See 137 CONG. REc. S10,952 (daily ed. July 25, 1991) (statement of Sen.
Lautenberg).
137. H.R. 3026, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991).
138. Id. § 2. One additional finding concerns sewage sludge. Subsection 4 reads,
"cities that have received awards from the Environmental Protection Agency for the
beneficial reuse of sewage sludge have been sued under Superfund because such sewage
sludge was present at Superfund sites." Id.
139. Id. § 83. TCEAA would also add a definition of "sewage sludge" and "munic-
ipality." See id.
140. Id. The amendment would read:
(39) The term 'municipal solid waste' means all waste materials generated by
households, including single and multiple residences, hotels and motels, and office
buildings. The term also includes trash generated by commercial, institutional,
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some may constitute hazardous substances under CERCLA when sep-
arate from MSW.141
More importantly, section 4 would limit third party suits against
generators of MSW.142 In codifying EPA's Municipal Settlement In-
terim Policy, TCEAA permits the government to bring an action
against a municipality only in "truly exceptional circumstances. 143
These circumstances exist when (1) there is evidence from a site that
hazardous substances have been released that are not ordinarily found
in MSW and that those substances come from a commercial, institu-
tional, or industrial source, or (2) the toxicity and volume of waste
from commercial, institutional, or industrial sources at the site is insig-
nificant in comparison with that of the MSW. 14 Thus, this section
would unequivocally eliminate third party suits against municipalities
and limit actions by the government to those in which the municipal-
ity's waste was of an unusual toxic nature, based on site-specific evi-
dence, or in which solely municipal garbage caused the release because
there were no industrial generators involved at the site.
and industrial sources when the general composition and toxicity of such materials
are similar to waste normally generated by households, or when such waste materi-
als, regardless of when generated, would be considered conditionally exempt gener-
ator waste under section 3001(d) of the Solid Waste Disposal Act because it was
generated in a total quantity of 100 kilograms or less during a calendar month.
The term 'municipal solid waste' includes all constituent components of municipal
solid waste, including constituent components that may be deemed hazardous sub-
stances under this Act when they exist apart from municipal solid waste. Examples
of municipal solid waste include food and yard waste, paper, clothing, appliances,
consumer product packaging, disposable diapers, office supplies, cosmetics, glass
and metal food containers, and household hazardous waste (such as painting,
cleaning, gardening, and automotive supplies). The term 'municipal solid waste'
does not include combustion ash generated by resource recovery facilities or mu-
nicipal incinerators.
H.R. 3026, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. § 3 (1991).
141. Id.
142. Section 113 of CERCLA would be amended to read:
(1) Contribution Actions for Municipal Solid Waste and Sewage Sludge.-No mu-
nicipality or other person shall be liable to any person other than the United States
for claims of contribution under this section or for other response costs or damages
under this Act for acts or omissions related to the generation, transportation, or
arrangement for the transportation, treatment, or disposal of municipal solid waste
or sewage sludge unless such acts or omissions provide a basis for liability under
sections 107(a)(1) or 107(a)(2) of this Act.
Id.
143. Id. § 4(i)(m).
144. Id. See supra note 78 for EPA's calculation of insignificant contributions.
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The settlements section, section 5, would modify CERCLA to make
settlements between EPA and municipalities more equitable.14 5 The
provisions of this section would govern settlements for those cases in
which the exceptions under the previous sections give EPA the right to
sue. 146 If a municipality requests a settlement, EPA must make every
effort to reach a final settlement of municipal liability within 120
days.147 The grounds for which the government can excuse its failure
to reach a settlement are limited to those cases which involve the mu-
nicipality refusing to agree to standard settlement provisions or to ad-
here to settlement criteria in the statute, or those cases in which the
government has insufficient information.14 For final settlement pur-
poses, EPA should consider only the amount of hazardous constituents
in the MSW, assumed to be 0.5% hazardous unless site-specific evi-
dence proves otherwise, rather than the overall volume of the MSW.1 4 9
Lastly, section 7 would make the new amendments applicable to all
sites in which a binding court order or court-approved settlement has
not resolved municipal liability.150 As written, TCEAA accomplishes
its goal to "fine-tune the Superfund statute to block opportunistic and
costly lawsuits by large corporate polluters against such innocent enti-
ties as the nation's cities and towns." 151
145. See H.R. 3026, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. § 5(n) (1991). This section of the bill
would amend § 122 of CERCLA to add a new subsection titled "(n) Settlements for
Municipal Generators and Transporters of Municipal Solid Waste or Sewage Sludge."
Id.
146. Id. § 5(n)(1).
147. Id. § 5(n)(2). The language reads:
(2) Timing of Settlements.-For applicable actions under this subsection, a munic-
ipality may request that the President enter into a settlement under this section.
The request may seek to settle a municipality's potential liability for all or part of
the response costs or damages to natural resources. Notwithstanding any other
deadlines under this Act, the President shall make every effort to reach a final
settlement with the municipality within 120 days after receiving such request.
Id.
148. Id. § 5(n)(3).
149. H.R. 3026, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. § 6 (1991).
150. Id. § 7.
151. Superfund Problems Facing Municipalities: Hearings on S. 1557 Before the
Subcomm. on Superfund, Ocean and Water Protection of the Senate Comm. on the
Environment and Public Works, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991) (statement of Sen.
Lautenberg).
Senator Donald Riegle (D-Mich) introduced the most recent attempt to limit munici-
pal liability in the form of an amendment to the Government-Sponsored Enterprises
bill. See S. 2733, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991). Similar to TCEAA, this bill would
prevent third party suits but allow EPA to pursue municipalities for contribution. 138
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V. UNDERSTANDING THE ISSUE OF MUNICIPAL LIABILITY:
PLIGHTS AND POLICIES
A. The Conflicting Perspectives of Industries and Municipalities
Under present interpretations, as advocated by industrial generators,
municipalities face costly lawsuits under CERCLA for the mere dispo-
sal of MSW. 52 Industries claim that municipalities are responsible for
disposing large volumes of waste, including some hazardous waste, at
landfills, and have not paid their share for the cleanup. From indus-
try's perspective, a fair means of apportionment would be on a volu-
metric basis. 53 Its contention rests on the theory that due to the high
volume of municipal waste dumped at the landfills, regardless of its
toxicity, industry's hazardous substances have spread and caused
greater damage than would have been the case absent the municipal
waste. Consequently, industry complains that it must treat tons of
MSW to get at the hazardous material it has been ordered to cleanup.
Moreover, even if industrial waste was highly toxic, the limited amount
of it that has seeped into the MSW has created a mixture more costly
to cleanup. 154
In addition, industry contends that even seemingly innocuous mu-
nicipal trash contains hazardous substances. 155 Because CERCLA re-
CONG. REc. S9389 (daily ed. June 23, 1992). Unlike the TCEAA, the bill would allow
a party liable for acts done three years after the law's enactment to appeal to the special
settlement provisions only if that municipality had in place a household hazardous
waste collection program. Id.
Also dissimilar is the bill's allocation scheme. The bill would order EPA to settle
with municipalities and limits municipal liability to 4% of the total cleanup costs. Id.
Each municipal generator would then be held liable for an "equitable share" of the total
4% liability. As under TCEAA, the prohibition on third party suits would apply retro-
actively. Id.
Although subject to much disapproval, the Senate defeated a motion to quash the
municipal liability limit by a vote of 52-44. 138 CONG. REc. S8648 (daily ed. June 23,
1992).
152. See supra notes 107-127 and accompanying text (discussing the holdings of
B.F Goodrich and Transportation Leasing).
153. See, eg., Keith Schneider, Industries and Towns Clash Over Who Pays to
Tackle Toxic Waste, N.Y. TiMEs, July 18, 1991, at Al.
154. The costs increase because the volume of MSW necessitates special processes,
like retaining walls and methane recovery systems. See Cynthia C. Kelly, Superfund
and Local Governments: Making the Process Work, PM, May 1991, at 13.
155. Industry acknowledges that MSW normally contains between 0.5% and 2%
hazardous constituents. Considering the large quantity of MSW at a landfill, industry
argues that there may therefore be a significant amount of hazardous waste cumula-
tively speaking. EPA Seen Leaning Toward Superfund Plan Holding Cities Liable For
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quires no threshold level of toxicity or minimum quantity of hazardous
substances for liability to attach,156 industry asserts that CERCLA's
broad remedial net should reach municipalities.
15 7
Industry's ulterior motive for targeting municipalities to shoulder
the costs rests on the long-term goal to undermine Superfund 5 8 By
trying to spread the burden of Superfund liability to as many parties as
Trash, INSIDE E.P.A., Oct. 18, 1991, at 1, 9. See also Ferrey, supra note 3, at 200-10
(discussing the volume and toxicology of MSW); Meegan, supra note 61, at 1795 n.73
(arguing in support of industry).
156. See Amoco Oil Co. v. Borden, Inc., 889 F.2d 664, 669-70 (5th Cir. 1989)
(holding that CERCLA's language does not require any quantitative amount of hazard-
ous substances); United States v. Conservation Chem. Co., 619 F. Supp. 162,238 (W.D.
Mo. 1985) (arguing that CERCLA imposes liability regardless of the volume or concen-
tration of hazardous substances); United States v. Carolawn Co., 21 Env't Rep. Cas.
(BNA) 2124, 2126 (D.S.C. 1984) (noting that CERCLA does not distinguish hazardous
substances on the basis of concentration); United States v. Wade, 577 F. Supp. 1326,
1339-40 (E.D. Pa. 1983) (holding that CERCLA requires no specific reportable quan-
tity or effluent standard).
157. See, e.g., 3550 Stevens Creek Assoc. v. Barclays Bank of California, 915 F.2d
1355 (9th Cir. 1990) (holding that CERCLA is to be given a broad interpretation to
accomplish its remedial goals); Dedham Water Co. v. Cumberland Farms Dairy, Inc.,
805 F.2d 1074, 1081 (1st Cir. 1986) (determining that, because CERCLA is meant to be
a remedial statute, its provisions must be liberally construed "to avoid frustration of the
beneficial legislative purposes"); United States v. Mottolo, 605 F. Supp. 898, 902
(D.N.H. 1985) (same).
158. Under this "conspiracy theory," industry's ultimate goal advocates total repu-
diation of the Superfund liability scheme. EPA Seen Leaning Toward Superfund Plan
Holding Cities Liable For Trash, INSIDE E.P.A., Oct. 18, 1991, at 1, 9. See also 138
CONG. REc. S8630 (daily ed. June 23, 1992) (statement of Sen. Lautenberg) ("We are
talking about a campaign designed to ultimately destroy the Superfund Program. The
worse its opponents make it look, the more people that are unhappy with it, the easier it
will be for industry to escape its cleanup responsibilities by gutting the law's liability
provisions.").
From the initial enactment of Superfund, industries have attempted to undermine its
success. For instance, constitutional challenges to CERCLA's retroactive application
have failed. See, eg., United States v. Monsanto Co., 858 F.2d 160, 173 (4th Cir. 1988)
("[E]ven if CERCLA is understood to operate retroactively, it nonetheless satisfies the
dictates of due process because its liability scheme is rationally related to a valid legisla-
tive purpose."), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1106 (1989). See also United States v. Northeast-
era Pharmaceutical & Chem. Co., 810 F.2d 726, 732-37 (8th Cir. 1986) (holding that
CERCLA liability applies to acts committed and costs incurred pre-enactment); United
States v. Ottati & Goss, Inc., 630 F. Supp. 1361, 1397-99 (D.N.H. 1985) (same); Town
of Booton v. Drew Chem. Corp., 621 F. Supp. 663, 668-69 (D.N.J. 1985) (same); United
States v. Ward, 618 F. Supp. 884, 898-99 (E.D.N.C. 1985) (same); United States v. Shell
Oil Co., 605 F. Supp. 1064, 1072-79 (D. Colo. 1985) (same); United States v. Reilly Tar
& Chem. Corp., 546 F. Supp. 1100, 1114-16 (D. Minn. 1982) (same); United States v.
Wade, 546 F. Supp. 785, 789-94 (E.D. Pa. 1982) (holding off-site generators of wastes
disposed of before CERCLA's enactment liable under § 107 but not under § 106).
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possible, some corporations hope their efforts will force the threatened
parties to lobby for changes in cleanup liability.159 Municipalities have
resorted to lobbying, but not with the intention of doing away with the
joint and several liability scheme as industry hoped.16° Municipal op-
position to liability focuses on the inequity of forcing local govern-
ments to pay for cleanup costs. The arguments advanced principally
involve considerations of municipalities' uniqueness as a source. Mu-
nicipalities note the unique nature of the MSW generated and dumped,
as well as their unique position as a political subdivision and their obli-
gations as such.
With respect to their waste, municipal defendants argue that the
principal inquiry to determine liability should focus on the actual dam-
age that the toxic constituents of the particular entity's waste cause,
not on the volume of waste. Given MSW's low toxicity, municipalities
point out that if corporate PRPs had not dumped their highly toxic
waste at the landfills, thus commingling it with the MSW, the landfills
would not have become Superfund sites in the first place. Although
about twenty percent of the landfills named on the Superfund national
priority list are considered "municipal" sites, 161 most of these sites con-
tain both MSW and industrial waste. Only a few have been found to
contain solely MSW. 162 This supports the inference that absent codis-
posal, the dangerous conditions would not have been created.163 Con-
sidering the varied components of MSW, municipalities argue that they
should not be held liable absent site-specific evidence of hazardous con-
stituents in their waste stream.
The other consideration to be taken into account relates to munici-
palities' duties as governmental entities. Local governments feel that
courts should not subject them to liability for merely providing a ser-
vice to their citizens. 164 Unlike industrial polluters, municipalities do
159. EPA Kicks Off Major Effort to Shield Cities From Industry Superfund Law-
suits, INSIDE E.P.A., July 19, 1991, at 1, 7-8.
160. See supra note 131 for ACCE's proposals.
161. 40 C.F.R. pt. 300, app. B (daily ed. July 1, 1991). See supra note 16 noting
that "municipal" sites are those owned or operated by municipalities, along with those
privately owned or operated that frequently allow the disposal of MSW.
162. Steinzor & Lintner, supra note 18, at n.4.
163. Upon analyzing the actual commingling of the industrial waste with the MSW,
the MSW may have "cushioned" the hazardous wastes from causing more severe dam-
age. See 138 CONG. REc. H918 (daily ed. March 3, 1992) (statement of Rep.
Martinez).
164. See, eg., B.F. Goodrich Co. v. Murtha, 958 F.2d 1192, 1199 (2d Cir. 1992)
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not profit from the disposal. Consequently, municipalities are not able
to absorb or transfer the costs like corporations. 165
Under current interpretations of Superfund liability, municipalities
find themselves caught in an unfortunate predicament. Unlike indus-
trial defendants, municipalities did not have reason to know about the
potential toxic effects of the substances they were handling. If they had
known, they could have prepared for it. For example, they could have
secured liability coverage.1 66 Indeed, because it was not the municipal-
(noting the appellants' argument that liability cannot attach to a municipality when it is
acting in its sovereign capacity).
165. Unlike municipalities, industry estimates its potential liability and factors that
estimate into its decisionmaking. In the final analysis, any costs can be diffused to con-
sumers through price increases. But cf. Washington, supra note 64, at 819 (arguing that
municipalities may diffuse costs even to a greater extent due to their broad taxable
group as opposed to industry's limited consumer group).
166. Insurance may pay a significant portion of the cleanup costs. Many municipal-
ities have purchased comprehensive general liability (CGL) insurance policies. But see
James R. Hackney, Jr., A Proposal of State Funding for Municipal Tort Liability, 98
YALE L.J. 389, 389 (1988) (noting that some municipalities have had to forego liability
insurance and face the risk of bankruptcy due to increased municipal insurance premi-
ums). Coverage under these policies includes all risks, unless specifically excluded.
In the 1970s, however, the insurance industry added what became known as the pol-
lution exclusion clause. This clause excludes coverage for pollution damage unless the
injury or damage was "sudden and accidental." Interpretations differ as to the meaning
of "sudden and accidental" in coverage litigation. Compare Avondale Indus., Inc. v.
Travelers Indem. Co., 887 F.2d 1200, 1202 (2d Cir. 1989) (affirming decision in favor of
insured coverage for pollution damage); New Castle County v. Hartford Accident &
Indem. Co., 673 F. Supp. 1359, 1361 (D. Del. 1987) (denying insurers' motion for sum-
mary judgment in action seeking to deny benefits for pollution damage); Claussen v.
Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 380 S.E.2d 686 (Ga. 1989) (holding in favor of insured
coverage for pollution damage); Du-Wel Prod., Inc. v. United States Fire Ins. Co., 565
A.2d 1113, 1115 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1989) (same); and Just v. Land Reclama-
tion, Ltd., 456 N.W.2d 570, 572-73 (Wis. 1990) (same); with Lumbermens Mut. Cas.
Co. v. Belleville Indus., Inc., 555 N.E.2d 568 (Mass. 1990) (denying coverage); Powers
Chemco, Inc. v. Federal Insurance Co., 548 N.E.2d 1301, 1302 (N.Y. 1989) (same); and
Technicon Electronics Corp. v. American Home Assurance Co., 544 N.E.2d 1048, 1049
(N.Y. 1989) (same).
For more thorough discussions of insurance coverage for environmental cleanup, see
generally Robert D. Chesler et al., Patterns of Judicial Interpretation of Insurance Cov-
erage for Hazardous Waste Site Liability, 18 RUTGERS L.J. 9 (1986) (discussing the
Comprehensive General Liability Policy and its Pollution Exclusion Clause); Jeffrey
Kehne, Encouraging Safety Through Insurance-Based Incentives: Financial Responsibil-
ity for Hazardous Wastes, 96 YALE L.J. 403 (1986) (arguing that insurance-based incen-
tives could greatly help control the risks associated with hazardous wastes); E. Joshua
Rosenkranz, Note, The Pollution Exclusion Clause Through the Looking Glass, 74 GEO.
L.J. 1237 (1986) (proposing a model for insurance coverage); Amy L. Fisher, Comment,
The Pollution Exclusion Clause: In Favor of the Insurer or the Insured? Just v. Land
Reclamation, Ltd., 40 WASH. U.J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 209 (1991) (discussing the
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ities themselves which generated the waste, but their residents, they
were not in a position to control the amount or type of waste
handled.167
Furthermore, at the time such waste was handled, it was processed
under the regulations of RCRA,"6 s which excluded household waste
from its hazardous waste regulatory scheme. 169 To impose liability on
an entity for the past disposal of waste, the same waste that was ex-
empted from hazardous regulation at the time of initial disposal, would
create an inconsistency in the overall framework of hazardous waste
regulation. 1
70
Municipalities find themselves disadvantaged in other respects as
well; one being their lack of experience with Superfund. Corporations
have been involved with Superfund since its inception. Due to their
inexperience, municipalities are strategically at a disadvantage.' 71 For
instance, novice defendants stand unaware of the intricacies of negotia-
tion strategies inherent in the cost allocation phase.172 As a result,
pollution exclusion clause); Eugene R. Anderson et al., Superfund: Is Your City In-
sured?, 32 MUNICIPAL ATTORNEY 1, 8-9, 14, 17-19 (Jan./Feb. 1991) (describing the
use of past statements to prove that insurance policies may cover environmental clean-
up costs).
167. But cf. Florio, supra note 11, at 118-19 ("[W]hile the state or local government
unit is the party least able to control the amount or even the type of waste generated,
the state or local government unit is subject to the same liability as [industry].").
168. See supra notes 28-30 and accompanying text explaining that RCRA was in-
tended to regulate the current disposal of solid waste, while CERCLA was enacted to
address the past disposal of waste. Nonhazardous municipal solid waste is regulated
under Subtitle D of RCRA. In contrast, hazardous waste falls under the more arduous
regulation of Subtitle C. See supra notes 54-57 and accompanying text for a discussion
of RCRA's categorization for treatment of waste under Subtitles C and D.
169. See supra note 57 noting RCRA's household waste exclusion.
170. If the disposal of MSW was found sufficient to incur liability under CERCLA,
then a municipality handling such waste under Subtitle D of RCRA would be treated as
if it disposed of Subtitle C waste. See supra note 54 describing MSW's treatment under
Subtitle D and hazardous waste treatment under Subtitle C of RCRA.
171. Steinzor, supra note 4, at 81 ("Most local governments have only a vague un-
derstanding of how the law operates ... and... many function at a level of sophistica-
tion that lags years behind the strategic abilities of private industrial participants .... ).
172. Id. Small businesses are similarly disadvantaged. As exemplified at the Lud-
low Landfill in New York, two large corporations who agreed to pay S9 million in
cleanup costs subsequently sued hundreds of area towns and small businesses for S5
million in contribution. See Robert Tomsho, Pollution Ploy: Big Corporations Hit By
Superfund Cases Find Way to Share Bill, WALL ST. J., Apr. 2, 1991, at Al. The strat-
egy is to request a high estimated contribution and then negotiate for a lesser amount if
the party settles early. Realizing the consequences of a drawn out legal battle, most
small parties resort to accepting the settlement offer. As one small pizzeria owner said,
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they are forced to pay a disproportionate share of the cleanup cost.
Municipalities also face a financial disadvantage. Local governments
can not raise revenues or disperse the costs as can industrial entities.
Municipalities have very limited resources. Requiring them to bear the
burden of cleanup costs plus litigation costs could deplete their entire
budget.173 As a result, municipalities risk bankruptcy. In the alterna-
tive, their limited financial resources force them to make other com-
promises, such as raising taxes, increasing trash-hauling fees, laying off
public employees, or cutting public services.174 Because the threat of
liability now haunts every local government, 7 ' the municipal perspec-
tive must be considered.
B. Policy Goals of Superfund
CERCLA essentially addresses two policy goals: cleanup and deter-
"You don't have a choice... small businesses can't afford to fight these large corpora-
tions." Id. The corporations involved in the Ludlow case even gave the parties a "holi-
day offer": parties that settled by January 15, 1991 could do so for half price, those who
did not would be sued in full. Id. at A14. Eighty-five percent of the defendants ac-
cepted the offer. Id.
173. These threatening costs come at a time when local governments are involved in
a fiscal crisis. According to a 1992 survey conducted by the National League of Cities,
the economies of more than 50% of American cities are at deficit levels. Financial
Burdens Mount as Cities Struggle with Budget Stress; Tough Choices Diminishing Qual-
ity of Life and Ability to Help; Local Officials Say Candidates Need to "Get Real"About
Problems, Press Release (Nat'l League of Cities, Washington, D.C.), July 8, 1992, at 1.
Meanwhile, nearly four out of five (78.7%) cities say that they are less able to satisfy
their financial needs in 1992 than in 1991. Id. at 3.
174. See Tomsho, supra note 172, at Al. For example, the City Manager of Bell,
California, who now confronts a $1.5 million settlement offer, has already had to fire
two city employees and increase citizens' trash-hauling fees almost two-fold. Id.
175. Industrial corporations have filed or threatened to fie approximately 22 third
party suits according to one estimate. 138 CONG. REc. S8630 (daily ed. June 23, 1992)
(statement of Sen. Lautenberg). These suits involve municipalities situated in I 1 states,
primarily California, Colorado, Michigan, Minnesota, New Jersey, New York, Penn-
sylvania, and Wisconsin. In total, at least 450 municipalities and 1,000 small businesses
and nonprofit groups have been targeted. Id.
The Los Angeles-Long Beach Harbor case exemplifies the legal blitzkrieg. There
Potlatch Corporation and Simpson Paper Company have fied third party suits against
115 local governments for owning the pipelines into which the companies poured haz-
ardous materials. Keith Schneider, Industries Battle Cities on Funds for Toxic Waste,
N.Y. TIMES, July 18, 1991, at Al, A9 (chart showing suits pending). See also infra note
198 listing municipal parties involved in litigation.
The fear of liability becomes more ominous when municipalities are involved in mul-
tiple landfills. See Tomsho, supra note 172, at Al (noting the predicament of the city of
Bellmawr, New Jersey, and its involvement with two lawsuits).
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rence. The former contemplates a massive, comprehensive scheme of
suing responsible parties for the cleanup costs. 176 The latter goal fur-
thers the objective of improving waste management. To prevent con-
tinued destruction of the environment, parties must be deterred from
unsafe practices and encouraged to improve activities involving waste
disposal.
1. Cleanup
Superfund bases cleanup liability on a "polluter should pay" princi-
ple.z77 That means that those responsible for the release or threatened
release should pay an amount in proportion to the amount of hazard-
ous substances handled. The scheme proposed by industry, a formula
based on the volume of waste, frustrates a proportional formulation.
To equate a ton of industrial waste to a ton of MSW is erroneous be-
cause an industrial generator is not on equal terms with a municipal
generator.178 Even EPA differentiates them and considers a contribu-
tion of household waste as insufficient to bring about notification as a
PRP.17 9 This policy choice, of course, does not foreclose liability suits
for contribution.' 8° It does, however, acknowledge the uniqueness of
municipal generators.
As public entities, municipalities provide a service for the disposal of
their citizens' waste. In this vein, municipalities essentially personify
their citizens collectively.1 81 Thus, prosecuting municipal residents di-
176. See United States v. Wade, 577 F. Supp. 1326, 1331 (E.D. Pa. 1983) ("[CER-
CLA] is intended to facilitate the prompt clean-up of hazardous waste dump sites and
when possible to place the ultimate financial burden upon those responsible .... "). See
also H.R. REP. No. 1016, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 67 (1980), reprinted in 1980
U.S.C.C.A.N. 6119, 6143.
177. See H.R. 3026, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. § 2 (1991) (adding the finding that "there
is a need for a reaffirmation of the policies that are the basis for Superfund... including
the principle that the polluter should pay for cleanup").
178. See supra notes 165-174 and accompanying text discussing the disadvantaged
position of municipalities.
179. EPA's Interim Policy, supra note 10, at 51,073. EPA's policy states as follows:
[B]ased on our experiences at Superfund sites, especially municipal landfills, we
believe that it is generally not a cost-effective use of our enforcement resources to
pursue those generators/transporters whose only contribution at a Superfund site
appears to have been substances that may have been contaminated only with rela-
tively small quantities of household hazardous waste (e.g., municipal solid waste).
Id.
180. Id. at 51,071 ("Njothing in the interim policy precludes a third party from
initiating a contribution action.").
181. Amicus Brief of American Communities for Cleanup Equity at 4, B.F. Good-
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rectly is the next logical step in expanding liability. I"2 Congress, how-
ever, never intended to hold citizens liable for the disposal of
household trash.
183
Using a volumetric approach to cost allocation could force munici-
palities to pay as much as ninety percent of the cleanup costs. 18 4 This
would be in complete disproportion with the actual amount of hazard-
ous substances contained in MSW. The fact that the Superfund sites
where industrial and municipal waste were codisposed would not be on
the NPL had only MSW been dumped at the site makes the unfairness
of allocating remedial costs under a method that considers strictly vol-
ume even more evident. 85 Accordingly, imposing liability on munici-
palities, especially under the conventional volumetric apportionment
method, undermines CERCLA's liability scheme of having polluters
pay for cleanup.
2. Deterrence
The deterrence theory under Superfund rests on the idea that the
threat of strict liability will create an incentive for improved waste dis-
posal. I"6 The legislative history states that "it is essential that this in-
centive for greater care focus on the initial generators.., since they...
create the hazardous wastes, they have more knowledge about the risks
inherent in their waste and how to avoid them .... ,,1 8 7 Unlike indus-
rich Co. v. Murtha, 754 F. Supp. 960 (D. Conn. 1991) (No. 91-7450) ("[governmental]
institutions stand in the place of ordinary citizens").
182. Indeed, one over-zealous attorney for a corporate PRP has threatened a suit of
this kind against the citizens of New York City. Designation of Metals as Hazardous
Disputed in New York City Landfill Cost Recovery Suit, 21 ENv'TL REP. (BNA) 1653
(Jan. 11, 1991).
183. Governor Jim Florio of New Jersey, one of the original drafters of Superfund
law, comments that "[t]he very clear intent of the law is that corporate polluters are to
be made responsible for cleaning up toxic wastes." Keith Schneider, Industries and
Towns Clash Over Who Pays to Tackle Toxic Waste, N.Y. TIMES, July 18, 1991, at Al.
184. See Barnaby J. Feder, E.P.A. Proposal on Costs of Waste Cleanups Is Halted,
N.Y. TIMES, May 18, 1992, at DI (noting one instance in Southern California where
communities may be responsible for $500 million in the $800 million cleanup of a
landfill).
185. See supra notes 17-18 and accompanying text explaining the codisposal of in-
dustrial waste with MSW.
186. Meegan, supra note 61, at 1793.
187. Id. at 1793 n.58 (quoting S. REP. No. 848, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 11-12 (1980),
reprinted in 1 SENATE COMM. ON ENVIRONMENT AND PUBLIC WORKS, 97TH CONG.,
2D SESS., A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE COMPREHENSIVE ENVIRONMENTAL RE-
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trial generators, who know and may control their waste material, mu-
nicipalities, in collecting the waste of others, are not in a position to
know the inherent risks of the waste. '88 Furthermore, while theoreti-
cally local governments may attempt to minimize their potential liabil-
ity by removing all hazardous substances from their waste before
disposal, as a practical matter, achieving this, let alone enforcing it, is
extremely tenuous. Considering the large number of households, it is
idealistic to think municipalities could improve their waste collection
methods so as to remove the less than one percent of their waste that is
considered hazardous.
The goal of deterrence also relates to improving waste management,
such as implementing recycling and treatment programs. Improving
waste management, however, is costly.189 Forcing municipalities to
subsidize the industrial share of waste cleanup would exhaust the funds
for improved waste treatment."9 A more reasonable and effective
method for inducing municipalities to improve waste management
would be to impose liability, if at all, in a more flexible manner. One
possible method would allow municipalities to reduce their liability or
offer some other protection if they had in place a hazardous waste col-
lection program. 91 In the final analysis, the deterrence rationale for
imposing liability is specious when applied to municipalities absent
SPONSE, COMPENSATION, AND LIABILITY AcT OF 1980 (SuPERFuND), Pub. L. No. 96-
510, at 318-19).
188. Florio, supra note 11, at 118 ("[A] local government unit discharging its func-
tion as a sovereign in collecting and disposing of waste is neither in a position to know
nor is expected to know that the waste would pollute."). Cf. Washington, supra note
64, at 818 ("The liability costs are factored into the choice of enterprise activity level,
thus influencing the volume of waste that will be produced.").
189. See Maria Cone, Cities' Tactics Vary in the War Against Waste, L.A. TIMES,
Mar. 22, 1991, at Bi, B4 (estimating that recycling programs may cost a municipality
millions of dollars).
190. Due to the national economy, municipalities cannot rely on the federal govern-
ment for funding. "Since 1980, federal funding assistance for priority municipal pro-
grams... has been cut by more than half, falling from a high of $48.4 billion to as low
as $19.5 billion." Joe Petruzzi, Mayor of the Borough of Bellmawr, New Jersey, testi-
mony before the Superfund Subcommittee of the Senate Environment and Public Works
Committee (July 29, 1991).
191. The amendment to Senator Riegle's Government-Sponsored Enterprises bill
allows a municipality to take advantage of expedited final settlements if it had in opera-
tion a qualified household hazardous waste collection program. See 138 CONG. REc.
S9389 (daily ed. July 1, 1992). The amendment notes that an acceptable program
would have the following characteristics:
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consideration of their unique circumstance.1 92
VI. ALTERNATIVES FOR ALLOCATING COSTS OF
SUPERFUND LIABILITY
Under the current statutory language of CERCLA, municipalities
find no exemption from liability. The present scheme of imposing lia-
bility through contribution suits, however, is an inefficient and expen-
sive means of extending liability to municipalities. Contribution suits
tend to result in high transaction costs. 193 The costs of drawn out liti-
gation may even exceed the municipalities eventual portion of
liability.1
94
One option for change is to amend the current framework by ban-
ning corporate PRPs from allocating costs through contribution suits.
The Toxic Cleanup Equity and Acceleration Act advocates this ap-
proach, 195 but it has confronted strong opposition.' 9 6 In the absence of
(A) at least semiannual, well-publicized collections at conveniently located col-
lection points with an intended goal of participation by ten percent of community
households;
(B) a public education program that identifies both hazardous household prod-
ucts and safer substitutes (source reduction);
(C) efforts to collect hazardous waste from conditionally exempt generators
under section 3001(d) of the Solid Waste Disposal Act (because they generated a
total quantity of 100 kilograms or less during a calendar month), with an intended
goal of collecting wastes from twenty percent of such generators doing business
within the jurisdiction of the municipality; and
(D) a comprehensive plan, which may include regional compacts or joint ven-
tures, that outlines how the program will be accomplished.
Id. at S9390.
192. But see Meegan, supra note 61, at 1793-94 (arguing that holding municipalities
liable will induce proper MSW disposal); Washington, supra note 64, at 818 (arguing
for municipal liability as a means of making resident polluters pay and realize the im-
portance of minimizing hazardous waste).
193. Transaction costs are any costs that do not go toward the actual site cleanup.
They include administrative, legal, engineering, consulting, and other management
costs expended by EPA and parties involved. Rather than going toward actual cleanup,
these costs go toward establishing liability for site cleanup, along with cost allocation
between the PRPs, the PRPs and the Superfund, and between PRPs and their insurers.
See John T. Hedeman et al., Superfund Transaction Costs: A Critical Perspective on the
Superfund Liability Scheme, 21 ENVTL. L. REP. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,413 (July 1991).
194. But see Draft Superfund Study Finds Most Legal Fees Do Not Dwarf Cleanup
Spending, INSIDE E.P.A., Oct. 25, 1991, at 3 (citing study done by the Rand Corpora-
tion which concluded that, except for the insurance industry, transaction costs do not
exceed cleanup costs).
195. See supra notes 142-144 and accompanying text analyzing § 4 of TCEAA.
196. Industrial groups critical of the legislation oppose a ban on third party suits
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express statutory authority for a new approach to municipal liability,
EPA 197 and courts 19 8 are left with the dilemma of how to apportion
because of the unfairness of protecting an entire class of PRPs from liability. They also
contend that sheltering municipalities from contribution suits will undermine the deter-
rence goal of CERCLA because, without accountability, municipalities will have no
incentive to minimize the amount of hazardous substances in their waste stream. See
Meegan, supra note 61, at 1794 ("[The] history of haphazard waste disposal indicates
that municipalities need incentives to ensure proper handling of such waste in the
future.").
197. In response to the TCEAA legislation, EPA announced that it would explore a
new policy initiative. EPA Kicks Off Major Effort to Shield Cities From Industry
Superfund Lawsuits, INSIDE E.P.A., July 19, 1991, at 1, 7-8. The effort includes trying
to expedite settlements with cities, drafting a model settlement plan, and pursuing con-
tributions from municipalities in exchange for protection from third party suits. Id.
EPA held a conference on October 10-11, 1991, to discuss guidelines for allocating costs
for MSW at Superfund sites. See EPA Seen Leaning Toward Superfund Plan Holding
Cities Liable for Trash, INSIDE E.P.A., Oct. 18, 1991, at 1, 8-10 (discussing the three
approaches advanced at the conference); Cities, Industry Concerned by Early Options for
Distributing Superfund Costs, INSIDE E.P.A., Oct. 11, 1991, at 3-4 (discussing the draft
options for cost allocation).
198. Besides the cases of B.F. Goodrich and Transportation Leasing, at least 11
other suits pose the question of proper cost allocation. The list includes:
(1) Los Angeles-Long Beach Harbors, California (115 municipalities face estimated
cleanup costs of $350 million);
(2) Lowry Landfill, Arapahoe County, Colorado (EPA has sued a number of cities
for disposal of sewage sludge and could allocate costs on the basis of the volume of
sludge each disposed);
(3) Charles-George Reclamation Landfill, Tyngsborough, Massachusetts (12 munici-
palities face possible apportionment on a volumetric basis which may reach $51 mil-
lion);
(4) Mason County Landfill, Pere Marquette Township, Michigan (at least two mu-
nicipalities served with third party complaints by industrial PRPs);
(5) Metamora Landfill, Metamora, Michigan (27 municipalities and other entities,
including the local Girl Scouts and Boy Scouts, face a lawsuit by PRPs);
(6) GEMS landfill, Gloucester Township, New Jersey (private PRPs suing 70 munic-
ipalities and requesting contributions totaling $10 million of the $52 million estimated
cleanup);
(7) Helen Kramer Landfill, Mantua Township, New Jersey (16 corporations suing 18
municipalities for contribution toward the estimated $56 million cleanup);
(8) Lone Pine Landfill, Freehold Township, New Jersey (approximately 20 munici-
palities threatened to pay major portion of estimated $52-70 million cleanup);
(9) Ludlow Sand & Gravel, Clayville, New York (25 municipalities named as fourth-
party defendants in landfill cleanup action, 85% of which have already settled under
plaintiffs' attorney's allocation scheme);
(10) Moyer Landfill, Eagleville, Pennsylvania (seven municipalities sued for disposal
of MSW); and
(11) Mid-State Disposal Site, Cleveland Township, Wisconsin (11 municipalities
seeking settlement with Weyerhauser Company; settlement under review by district





One proposed method of cost allocation, described as a "trial bal-
loon," 19 9 would apportion costs through three stages. 2° ° First, EPA
would calculate the national average cost to clean up a ton of MSW
and a ton of industrial hazardous waste.2 1 From these figures, EPA
would establish a ratio for the costs of cleaning up MSW versus indus-
trial waste.2 2 This ratio would determine the total cost allocation at a
given site.20 3
The second stage would determine whether the municipality could
offer in-kind contributions in lieu of cash payments.2' For instance, a
locality may own a waste water treatment facility. By allowing a
cleanup contractor to access the facility, the municipality could deduct
from its contribution amount the market rate for constructing such a
facility.20 5 The third stage would consider equitable factors, like a mu-
206nicipality's ability to pay.
The trial balloon method of cost allocation would apportion, how-
ever, an inequitable share on municipalities. The formulation bases
Communities for Cleanup Equity (1992) (on file with author). See also supra note 24
for a list of suits pending that involve municipalities.
199. This scheme of allocation is also referred to as the "double delta theory." EPA
Plan for Allocating Superfund Costs Surprises, Outrages Cities, INSIDE E.P.A., Dec. 20,
1991, at 1, 8 [hereinafter EPA Plan]. Similar to the "delta theory," which some have
advocated, the "double delta theory" "attempts to charge polluters for the costs of
cleanup that derive from their waste streams." Id. at 8. For a critical analysis of the
"delta theory," see Steinzor, supra note 4, at 123-25.
200. EPA assistant administrator for Solid Waste and Emergency Response, Don
Clay, offered the "trial balloon" scheme of cost allocation at a speech he gave to the
National League of Cities on December 12, 1991. See EPA Plan, supra note 199, at 8.
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. To illustrate this formulation, suppose a site has 100,000 tons of MSW and
20,000 tons of industrial waste. If the average cost for cleaning up a ton of MSW is
$1000 and $10,000 per ton for industrial waste, then the cost ratio would be $100 mil-
lion for municipalities and $200 million for industry: a ratio of 1:2. Consequently, if
cleanup costs were $30 million, industry would pay $20 million and municipalities
would pay $10 million. See infra note 208 setting forth ACCE's chart illustrating cost
percentages calculated under various ratio schemes.
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costs on the volume of waste.2" Consideration of the toxic differences
is provided for only implicitly at the initial phase of calculating the
national averages of cost cleanup per ton of MSW versus industrial
waste. Because municipalities generate a high volume of MSW, the
proposed formula would require municipalities to pay approximately
thirty percent of the total cleanup.2 °8
Moreover, the use of this formula would undermine EPA's policy of
encouraging early settlements.' Municipalities will hesitate to sign
settlements with EPA when the consequences are so high. For those
who do not settle with EPA, industrial PRPs will pursue contribution
207. EPA justifies the volumetric formulation because "it is far easier to get infor-
mation on volume than on relative toxicity or percentage of toxic materials in municipal
waste." Id. at 10.
208. EPA Plan, supra note 199, at 8. Although EPA estimates the 30% break-
down, municipalities dispute that figure and argue that a more accurate estimate would
make them liable for more than 60% of the total cleanup. Id. The chart below illus-
trates the breakdown of potential liability percentages under the trial balloon formula.
PERCENTAGE OF CLEANUP CosTs LOCAL GOVERNMENTS WILL PAY UNDER
EPA's DRAFT ALLOCATION FORMULA
RATIO OF THE COSTS OF MSW CLEANUP
TO INDUSTRIAL HAZARDOUS WASTE CLEAUP
MSW
AT SITE 1:20 1:10 1:7 1:5 1:3 1:2 2:3 1:1
99% 83% 91% 93% 95% 97% 98% 99% 99%
95% 49% 66% 73% 79% 86% 91% 93% 95%
90% 31% 47% 56% 64% 75% 82% 86% 90%
75% 13% 23% 30% 38% 50% 60% 67% 75%
50% 5% 9% 13% 17% 25% 33% 40% 50%
25% 2% 3% 5% 6% 10% 14% 18% 25%
10% .6% 1% 2% 2% 4% 5% 7% 10%
1% .1% .1% .1% .2% .3% .5% .7% 1%
Source: American Communities for Cleanup Equity (Dec. 17, 1991).
209. See EPA Kicks Off Major Effort to Shield Cities from Industry Superfund Law-
suits, INSIDE E.P.A., July 19, 1991, at 1, 7 (noting that EPA's municipal initiative was
to "speed negotiations with cities").
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suits under" 'EPA-approved' method for calculating costs."'2 10 Conse-
quently, the trial balloon formula appears to favor litigious industrial
parties, much to the dismay of municipalities.2 1 1
B. Alternatives to the Trial Balloon Method of Apportionment
Suggested methods of determining settlement amounts for genera-
tors of MSW, other than the trial balloon formulation, vary greatly
depending on the particular viewpoint adopted. The list of possible
approaches includes: (1) volume times toxicity; (2) a focus on remedy;
(3) the availability of services; and (4) a fixed rate.2 12
Under the "volume times toxicity" plan, the percentage of waste at a
site that is municipal trash would be multiplied by a percentage that
represents the percent of hazardous substances present in the MSW.2 13
The calculated figure would represent the percentage of total costs mu-
nicipalities would have to pay.2 14
An alternative approach takes a more intense look at the particular
remedy involved. This scheme charges the costs of specific remedial
procedures to the party responsible for causing the condition necessi-
tating the treatment. 21 5 The method attempts to trace one or more
210. EPA Plan, supra note 199, at 8. See also Letter from Robert G. Torricelli,
Representative, U.S. House of Representatives, to William K. Reilly, Administrator,
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (Dec. 18, 1991) (on file with author) ("For the
first time, EPA would bring certainty to the Superfund litigation process by allowing
polluters to perform a few simple calculations to determine the large amounts they
could collect by suing other parties.").
211. As a consequence of strong opposition to the trial balloon proposal, EPA re-
opened discussion on other possible approaches to cost allocation. EPA Backs Awayfrom Waste Chief's Plan to Assign Superfund Costs by Volume, INSIDE E.P.A., Jan. 3,
1992, at 3. Other approaches include a volume-toxicity formula, a remedial focus, in-
kind services, a fixed rate, or a "unit cost" ratio. In Marked Shift from December Plan:
EPA Options for Dividing Superfund Costs Cut Cities' Share by Over Half, INSIDE
E.P.A., March 6, 1992, at 1, 8. See infra text accompanying notes 213-19 describing
each option.
212. See EPA Interim Settlement Guidance, supra note 16, at 20-24.
213. Id. at 20. The percentage of MSW thought hazardous is estimated between
0.5% and 2%. See supra note 14 noting the results of numerous surveys.
214. To illustrate, if the volume of MSW is 1,000,000 tons, the total volume of all
waste is 1,500,000, the cost of the remedy is $40,000,000, and the MSW has a toxicity of
0.3%, the formula for calculating the settlement amount would read: 0.03 x(1,000,000/1,500,000) x $40,000,000 = $80,000. Thus, the municipal parties would
pay a total of $80,000 of the total $40,000,000 remedial cost for the site.
215. See EPA Interim Settlement Guidance, supra note 16, at 21-22.
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distinct aspects of the remedy to a party.2 16 If a certain remedy or part
of a remedy were prescribed to treat MSW, then the municipal parties
would be responsible for a percentage of that treatment.
A third method would allow the option of offering services in lieu of
monetary support. A party's settlement amount would depend on
what services the site requires, along with what services the particular
party could provide.217 In this vein, the services would be given a
value, and the locality could opt to pay the relative amount in cash if it
was unable or unwilling to provide the services.
A fixed rate approach to cost allocation would assign a certain per-
centage of the remedial costs to the generators. 213 EPA would select a
national percentage based on the average percentage cost to municipal-
ities of all the other approaches in consideration. The range of possible
percentages vary from anywhere between one to ten percent.219 This
flat percentage would apply regardless of the particular circumstances
of the site or municipal party.
C. Proposal. A Percentage Cap
Whatever option one adopts, the method of cost allocation should
acknowledge the undeniable differences between municipal and indus-
trial PRPs. The unique status of local governments, as well as the
unique nature of MSW, should be considered in determining a munici-
pality's fair share.220 Adoption of a unit cost formula with a standard-
ized percentage cap would provide an equitable means of apportioning
cleanup costs.221
216. Id. For example, particularly appropriate remedies for MSW include capping
or leachate collection regimens.
217. Id. at 22.
218. Id. at 24.
219. Id.
220. See, e.g., United States v. Stringfellow, 661 F. Supp. 1053, 1060 (C.D. Cal.
1987) ("The Court has discretion to use equitable factors in apportioning damages in
order to mitigate the hardships of imposing joint and several liability upon defendants
who have only contributed a small amount to a potentially large indivisible harm.").
221. After much debate and analysis of each option discussed in the previous sec-
tion of this Note, EPA released a draft notice for the Federal Register on March 10,
1992. EPA Draft Slashes Municipal Superfund Costs to 4%, Enraging Industry, INSIDE
E.P.A., Mar. 27, 1992, at 1, 8. Acting as a supplement to its 1989 Interim Municipal
Settlement Policy, EPA disclosed the methodology by which EPA will calculate the
amount that the municipal generators and transporters owe collectively. EPA Interim
Settlement Guidance, supra note 16, at 2. "[The] guidance is intended to facilitate set-
tlement with contributors of MSW." Id. at 3. Those municipalities that settle with
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MUNICIPAL LIABILITY
Under the unit cost approach, the first formulation would compare
the average national cost for remediation of an acre of industrial waste
to the cost of remediation for an acre of MSW.2 2 2 The average cost per
acre to remediate MSW is estimated at $94,000.223 In contrast, the
average cost per acre to remediate industrial waste is thought to be
$2,279,000.224 By dividing the municipal remediation cost by the sum
of the municipal and industrial remediation costs, 4% results.225 This
figure represents the specific percentage of the estimated total remedial
cost to be attributed to all the generators and transporters of MSW at
the site.226
The second phase would evaluate certain criteria that address the
EPA "will receive contribution protection as provided by CERCLA Section 113(f)."
Id.
In the guidance, EPA advocates adoption of the unit cost formula. EPA rationalizes
use of the unit cost theory by stating:
The Agency believes that volumetric apportionment, the conventional method for
arriving at settlements, is not appropriate for sites involving MSW because MSW
may contain a very low amount of hazardous substances in relation to the volume
of non-hazardous material. Even though certain studies suggest that MSW may
contain small amounts of a variety of hazardous substances, the total quantity of
such substances, according to these studies, is very low. In addition, there fre-
quently exists a lack of site-specific data and information necessary to accurately
attribute waste found at a MSW site to one particular MSW contributor. The
methodology by which a settlement is calculated in this guidance is designed to
account for this lack of certainty by providing a methodology for MSW settle-
ments. The Agency believes this approach is fair, reasonable and in the public
interest for all parties involved at a Superfund site.
Id. at 3-4.
Not long after EPA disclosed the guidance, industrial lobbyists voiced their disagree-
ment to President Bush's administration. Barnaby J. Feder, E.P.A. Proposal on Costs of
Waste Cleanups Is Halted, N.Y. TIMEs, May 18, 1992, at 01. Members of the White
House staff quickly pressured EPA to withdraw the notice and reopen discussion. Id.
Due to the controversial nature of any approach EPA adopts, it is not likely that EPA
will release a methodology until after the 1992 general election. See EPA Policy to Ease
Cities' Superfund Costs Appears to be Election Year Hostage, INSIDE E.P.A., June 5,
1992, at 9.
222. EPA Interim Settlement Guidance, supra note 16, at 13.
223. Id. at 13-14. This amount derives from the average cost to close a RCRA
Subtitle D landfill. See id. at 14 n.12, 31-33.
224. Id. at 14. This figure is based on the closure of an industrial waste landfill
under CERCLA. See id. at 14, 29-30, 33-35.
225. The exact formulation is as follows: MSW Unit Cost / (MSW Unit Cost +
Industrial Unit Cost), or more specifically, $94,000 / ($94,000 + $2,279,000) = 4%.
See id. at 14.
226. To illustrate, if the estimated cleanup cost is $50,000,000, the total settlement
amount for all MSW generators and transporters at the site would be $2,000,000.
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unique conditions of a site.227 The exact settlement may be adjusted
after consideration of: the litigation risks; the public interest; the vol-
ume of the waste contributed to the site; and the nature of the rem-
edy.228 More importantly, consideration would also be given to the
particular municipality's ability to pay."
To further aid municipal PRPs, the final phase would allow munici-
palities to offset some of their share by providing in-kind services in-
stead of cash payments.230 Substitute methods of contribution include,
for example, treating leachate at publicly owned treatment works, of-
fering security for the site, furnishing operation and maintenance serv-
ices, providing construction materials and equipment, and constructing
water lines.231 Although not obligated to offer in-kind services, if it so
chooses, a municipality may reduce its amount by the market value of
the services offered.232 Credit should also be given municipalities for
their efforts to reduce household hazardous waste, along with those
municipalities that handle MSW on a nonprofit basis.233
Use of the unit cost formulation and percentage cap, coupled with
the equitable considerations and the possibility of in-kind services, re-
sults in an overall equitable methodology for cost allocation. The 4%
cap is consistent with the municipal PRPs' degree of culpability. Be-
cause it acknowledges the low level of hazardous constituents present
in the municipal waste stream, as well as the relatively low health risks
caused by MSW, the formula protects municipalities from the draco-
nian method of volumetric formulations. The simplicity of the method
adds some degree of predictability and consistency to apportionment
cases nationwide.
With respect to the actual payment of damages, consideration of a
municipality's ability to pay must enter the picture.234 In light of a
227. EPA Interim Settlement Guidance, supra note 16, at 13.
228. Id. at 17.
229. Id.
230. Id. at 13. As used by EPA, in-kind services means "any services, facilities, or
other non-monetary support for the remedy or its maintenance." Id. at 18.
231. Id. at 18.
232. EPA Interim Settlement Guidance, supra note 16, at 18-19. "The 'market
value' approach.., is appropriate because these services would have to be purchased on
the open market if they were not offered by generators and transporters of MSW and
thus represent an avoided cost for the non-MSW parties." Id. at 19.
233. See Ferrey, supra note 3, at 276.




municipality's constrained position to generate revenue, in-kind meth-
ods of contribution should be a viable option. Application of this pro-
posed approach may persuade municipal PRPs to seek early settlement
with EPA, thus reducing their overall transaction costs.
Adopting the unit cost and percentage cap method makes for a fair
and reasonable compromise. On the one hand, it would not expressly
create a blanket exemption for municipalities, thus placating the indus-
trial and environmentalist sectors. On the other hand, it would reas-
sure local governments that they will not be forced to bear a
disproportionate share of the cleanup costs. Furthermore, allowing
more flexible means of contribution diminishes the aggregate amount
of municipal liability.
VII. CONCLUSION
As a consequence of corporate PRPs bringing third party suits
against municipalities seeking contribution, local governments must
now face Superfund's strict, joint and several liability scheme. Under
interpretations of EPA and the judiciary, municipalities face liability as
generators under CERCLA for their disposal of MSW. In an attempt
to limit municipal liability, legislation has been introduced to protect
municipalities from third party suits. With industry lobbying to allo-
cate the costs on a volumetric basis, the plight of municipalities rests in
the realization that they may be forced to pay as much per ton to clean
up MSW as industry pays to clean up industrial waste. Considering
the policies and positions involved, changes at the national level must
take place, through legislation or the discretionary power of EPA, so as
to protect municipalities and reaffirm the main principle of Superfund,
that the polluter should pay.
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